Village of  Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Authority Corp. by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1976
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Authority Corp.
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons,
Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Authority Corp. . Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 37. Powell
Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.
December 12, 1975 
~.The. hUtrlot List 1 ~ Sheet 3 
CA 1'.s decis'u""~ -" No. 75-616 ,.. 
+~s A?'-ACf "' VILLAGE OF 
~c ri;.J;O\'\. lw e.\ftd', ARLINGTON 
• J 11 .L 1 ft L HEIGHTS CA 1 .so.'" Thal o.e.i'Qc.n> 
~ous' S~~.{;~ Ve 
e~J tA. tiu~t-1 METRO HOUSING 
-- DEVELOPMENT '"'t. h>wN \v o.. CORPORATION 
Cert to CA 7 
(Swygert, Sprecher; ~ 
~c;tirchi~d,)C.J., t.A.L~ ~ 
~ssent~ng '~- __ .n 
Federal/Civil gv~ C:, .F/·7 
+~tc.t -ti~ c.o . 
atfevic.Je..""'~ rer,~• 1. SUMMARY: The case is 
t.vJt.sS ~tW. WQStt.. 
~~ 
best briefly summarize 
~""'eW ~+e~rt' by the CA 7 majority opinion: "The question in this 
Usli,."1rf.f..t..J.4.r is whether the Village of Arlington Heights 1 
~~ ~~r ~~~~rezone a piece of property in order to 
S"c.h!is of:N•Oto& wo~d struction of a 
'-4~+~ .. +. +f;r+;bf ~is income persons violates plaint· s' constitutional rights . 11 





2. FACTS & PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resp is an Illinois 
not-for-profit corporation organized to develop low and 
moderate income housing in t he Chicago metropolitan area. 
It was selected by t he owner s of a parcel of land in 
Arlington Heights t o develop the land for low and moderate 
income housing. The land i s vacant acreage bounded on two 
sides by single-famil y residences and on the other sides by 
t~e owners' undeveloped property. The owners agreed to 
lease the land for 99 years to resp, and the agreement pro-
vided that resp would develop low and moderate income housing 
subsidized pursuant to the National Housing and Urban Development 
Act of 1968, 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l. 
The land in question was, and always had been, zoned -
R-3 (single-family dwelling units) by petr Village. Petr's 
·• w~ 
"Comprehensive Plan, " adopted in 1959, provides that "an area 
should be zoned R-5 [multi-family dwelling units] only if it 
represents a 'buffer' zone or transition [area] between single 
family zoning and commercial, industrial, or other high in-
tensity areas." 517 F.2d, at 411. In order to develop the 
housing project, resp needed the land re-zoned from R-3 to R-5. 
Resp applied for such re-zoning. After hearings, petr's Plan 
Commission rejected re-zoning by a 6-1 vote. "The apparent reason 
for the rejection was that the property was in the middle of a 
completely single family area and would not act as a buffer zone ....._.._ _ _





When re-zoning was rejected, resps filed suit 
claiming "that the refusal to rezone perpetuated segregation 
and denied [resp] the right to use its property in a reason-
able manner in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982), the Civil Rights 
Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and the Fair Housing Act of 
1968 (42 U.S.C. § 3601, et ~.)." 517 F.2d, at 411. 
The District Court (N.D. Ill.) (McMillen, J.) denied 
relief. He found the Fair Housing Act irrelevant, 373 F. Supp. 
208, 209, and held that "[p]laintiffs have failed to carry 
their burden of proving discrimination by defendants against -
racial minorities as distinguished from the under-privileged 
generally .••• The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights ---/ Act[s?] prohibit discrimination against blacks and certain 
other minorities but does not afford rights to poor people as 
IJ...tt::... 
l 
such." 373 F. Supp., at 210. He found "no direct evidence" of 
racially discriminatory intent on petr's part. Ibid. Indeed, 
he found that petr had "good faith reasons" for pursuing its 
zoning scheme, which -- in light of decreased property values 
which would result from re-zoning -- he found rational. He also 
found that petr's re-zoning decisions had not been made 
arbitrarily or capriciously: petr had zoned 60 tracts for R-5 
use, some of which were still vacant and available to resp. 
~------- -CA 7 reversed in a 2-1 decision. The majority upheld as 
not clearly erroneous the District Court's findings that petr 
did not have racially discriminatory intent and did not re-zone 
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a~bitrarily or capriciously. The court then stated that 
the "real question is whether there is a racially dis-
·~·.: -iminatory effect for equal protection purposes [Emphasis 
anded] •11 517 F.2d, at 413. The court noted that Blacks 
comprise 40% of e l igible prospective tenants. (The method 
of computing t he figure is not given.) But, relying on 
James v. Valtierra , 402 U.S. 137, the court found that the 
rlass here affected was composed of low and moderate income 
tamilies and that the coincidental "racial disparity alone 
as .L t relat es t o t he housing project under consideration does 
~u ::- amoun t t o racial discrimination." 517 F.2d, at 413. 
However, the court said that the analysis of racial 
"~iscrimination for Equal Protection purposes did not stop there. 
Rather , re lying on Kennedy Parks Home Ass'n. v. City of 
~ackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (CA 2 1970), the court said that petr's 
.refusal to rezone "must be assessed not only in its immediate 
objective bu t its historical context and ultimate effect." 
117 F . 2d, at 413. The court then examined the "high degree of 
racial residential segregation" in metropolitan Chicago, the 
virt ually all-white makeup of Arlington Heights (1970 census: 
64,857 whites, 27 blacks), the need for low and moderate income 
housing there, and the racial impact resp's housing project woul d 
have (alleviation of housing need in Chicago area and increase of 
Arlington Heights' minority population by 1,000%, 517 F.2d, at 
414). In this light, the court found that petr ~ad "ignored" 





"exploiting the proble:TJ by ~allowing itself to become an 
almost one hundred per cent White community." 517 F.2d, 
at 414. Because of these "facts," the court held the petr's 
''rejection of the * * * proposal has racially discriminatory 
effects." 517 F.2d, at 415. The court subjected petr's 
It '' 1 • _/ 
zoning plan to strict scrutiny, and found that neither the ~ 7 
buffer policy of the zoning plan nor the protection of 
ne.ighborhood property values constituted compelling state 
interests. 
Chief Judge Fairchild filed a brief dissent. In 
essence, he thought that the District Court's findings of fact 
were not clearly erroneous and that resp could have constructed 
its project at one of the vacant R-4 sites. He did not take 
issue with the majority on the law, but rather appears to have 
concluded that resps suffered no injury since other sites 
already zoned for multi-family dwellings -- were available for 
the project. 
CA 7 denied rehearing en bane, 5-3 (PELL, TONE, BAUER, JJ, 
dissenting). 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
a. Petr contends that CA 7's decision conflicts 
with "repeated" decisions of this Court that housing and zoning 
are not subject to the compelling state interest test, and with 
decisions that hold inapplicable the compelling state interest 
test where the state act affects a lower income group that 
happens to have a higher percentage of blacks than whites. 
\ 
- 6 -
E.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1; James 
v. Valtierra, supra. Petr also contends that CA 7 erred in 
"substituting its judgment" for that of petr with respect to 
t he validity and reasonableness of the zoning ordinances. 
Finally, petr contends that under Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
no r esp had standing to sue. 
b. Resp contends that the decision is correct and 
h 
tha t CAs have uniformly refused to permit municipalities f t !!!ll 
obstructE&g private desegregation efforts. The decision is a 
narrow one, says resp, limited to "the facts of this case." 
CA 7 majority opinion, 517 F.2d, at 415. Resps have standing, 
they say, under Warth, because -- unlike the Warth plaintiffs 
-- they "challenged zoning testrictions as applied to particular 
projects that would supply housing within their means, and of 
which they were intended residents. The plaintiffs were thus 
able to demonstrate that unless relief from assertedly illegal 
actions was forthcoming, their immediate and personal interests 
would be harmed." 422 U.S., at 507. 
4. DISCUSSION: 
a. Standing -- Resps appear to be correct, at 
least with respect to plaintiff-intervenor-respondent Maldonado, 
who apparently fits the approved formulation in Warth, supra. 
b. Merits -- This is but one more of many cases 
wh~e munici~nint regulations have been atta~ed for th.eir 
alle ed raciall disc See, e.g., Preliminary 
Memo for No. 74-1293, City of Black Jack v. United States, cert . 




i!enied, June 23, 1975, rehearing denied, October 6, 1975. 
(But note that Black Jack arose under the Fair Housing Act.) 
CA 7vs reasoning i s very suspect. It relies in part on - -
Clark v, Universal Builders, supra, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 
821. However, Clark was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and CA 7 
there found evidence that blacks were charged prices "un-
reasonably in excess " of prices charged whites for similar 
housing. The cases and their rationales are easily dis-
t.inguisb.able. At bottom, CA 7 has admitted that there is no 
affected "suspect class" here but has nevertheless found 
"racially discriminatory effect" based on historical residential 
patterns and therefore applied a compelling state interest test. 
I find this hard to square with the principles of James v. 
Valtierra. 
c. Conflicts with Other CAs -- Petr alleges several 
conflicts between this decision and other CAs' decisions. Petrs 
overstate the problem, but it is nonetheless real. CA 7's de-
cision conflicts with Ybarra v. City of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 
250 (CA 9 1974). In Ybarra, CA 9 held valid a large-lot zoning 
ordinance challenged by poor Mexican-Americans who proved that 
the ordinance "prevented poor people from living in Los Altos." 
503 F.2d, at 253. CA 9 found no suspect class and concluded that 
the zoning ordinance was rational. (Resp says Ybarra is dis-
tinguishable, because CA 7 made the same holding but went on to 
find unlawful discriminatory impact. The distinction is dis-





Heights -- but CA 9 found it unnecessary to consider the 
"historical context " once deciding the question of suspect 
class.) 
In sum, CA 7 has -- in the words of the DC --
"extend[ed] the penumbra of the Fourteenth Amendment con-
siderably beyond its present outer limits." 373 F. Supp., 




There is a response. 
Hutchinson Order and CA 7 
Opinion in Petn., 
& reported at 373 
F.Supp. 208 and 
517 F.2d 409, 
respectively. 
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No. 75-616 
LFP/vsl 
July 15, 1976 
No. 75-616, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corporation, et al. 
This memorandum, dictated after a preliminary look at 
the briefs, is intended only as an "aid to memory" that will 
refresh my recollection when I return to a more careful study 
of the case prior to argument and decision. When an opinion is 
expressed or intimated, it is wholly tentative. 
* * * * 
Respondent, Metropolitan Housing Corporation, a non-
profit corporation organized to develop low income aousing in 
the Chicago metropolitan area, entered into a purchase and lease 
agreement with the Clerics of St. Vitor, a religious order, to 
develop a housing project in Arlington Heights, a suburb of 
Chicago. The agreement covered fifteen (15) acres of land that 
always had been zoned, R-3, single family. Indeed, all of the 
land surrounding the property in question was zoned R-3. In order 
to allow the proposed development, the fifteen acres would have 
to be rezoned to R-5, muti-family. The result would be fifteen 
.. 
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units per acre rather than four per acre under existing zoning. 
Respondents applied for a zoning change. After public 
hearings, the planning commission recommended against the rezoning, 
and the board of trustees of the Village voted 6-1 to deny the 
request. CA7 stated: 
The apparent reason for the rejection was 
that the property was in the middle of a 
completely single-family area and would 
not act as a buffer zone as required by 
the comprehensive plan. 
This suit was then instituted by respondent and three 
individual plaintiffs. They allege that the refusal to rezone 
perpetuated segregation and constituted a denial of rights under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Acts, and the Fair 
Housing Act. Respondents sought a declaratory judgment and in-
j unctive relief. 
Decisions Below 
Although standing of respondents (plantiffs) was 
challenged in the district court, that court "assumed" standing 
and decided the merits. The DC declined to certify any class. 
As to what the evidence showed, the DC found that the 
proposed multi-family housing development "would seriously damage 
the value of the surrounding single-family homes and that its 
presence in the area is strongly opposed by large groups of citizens 
of the Village." Even if citizen opposition was racially motivated, 
No. 75-616 3. 
the DC found that "the circumstantial evidence does not warrant 
the conclusion that this motivated" the town authorities (peti-
tioner): 
The weight of the evidence proves that the 
defendants were motivated with respect to 
the property in question by a legitimate 
desire to protect property values and the 
integrity of the Village's zoning plan. 
This is not an arbitrary or capricious act 
in derogation of the plaintiff's Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. (Petition for cert, B-6). 
The DC entered judgment for the Village. 
CA7, by a 2-1 vote, reversed. It concluded that "ul-
timate effect" of the refusal to rezone the property, and not 
the motivation of the Village, was controlling. That effect 
would be to deny low-cost housing to "the poor," including a 
substantial percentage of minority poor. It was estimated that 
some 4~/o of the eligible applicants for the housing would be 
black. 
CA7 emphasized the· history of segregation infue Chicago 
metropolitan area. But although the population of Arlington Heights 
was virtually all white, CA7 points to no discriminatory action 
directed against minorities. The majority opinion of CA7 does say 
that Arlington Heights "has been ignoring what is essentially the 
basic problem • [and] it has been exploiting the problem by 
allowing itself to become an almost 10~/o white community." 
CA7 concluded, without citation of any relevant authority, 
No. 75-616 4. 
and ignoring the Supreme Court decisions, that the compelling 
state interest test applied, and held that the Village had failed 
to show such an interest. 
Judge Fairchild, dissenting, apparently accepted the 
"compelling inte:r:est test," but disagreed with the majority's 
conclusion that other economically feasible sights were not 
available. Judge Fairchild's opinion, like that of the majority, 
is singularly devoid of analysis. 
The Equal Protection Issue 
CA7 erred in applying the compelling interest test. 
There is no authority in this Court supporting the view that there 
is a constitutional right to housing or any particular kind of 
housing. Although obviously of vital importance, housing is in 
the same category constitutionally as welfare and education. 
CA7, as well as respondent in its brief, ignores the 
most relevant decisions of this Court: Village of Belle Terre, 
416 u.s. 1; Lindsay v. Normat, 405 u.s. 56; James v. Valtierra, 
402 u.s. 13~ and Rodriguez, 411 u.s. 1. 
This is essentially a zoning ordinance case which re-
spondents have sought to test as a civil rights, equal protection 
case. The zoning ordinance of this Village appears to be typical 
of zoning ordinances that have been sustained by the courts for 
at least half a century. No one contends that it is invalid on 
No. 75-616 s. 
its face, and the district court found as a fact that there was 
no racial motivation in declining to rezone property that had 
been zoned residential for many years. As the court indicated 
in Village of Belle Terre, zoning ordinances are sustained so long 
as they are rationally related to a legitimate state objective. 
If there was a discriminatory effect in this case, its 
impact was primarily upon "the poor" and was not specifically 
directed against the estimated 4~/o black citizens who theoretically 
constituted the market for the housing project. 
Fair Housing and Civil Rights Acts 
Although the complaint purported to rely on these 
statutes, neither the DC nor CA7 addressed them. The courts below 
considered this case as an equal protection attack on the action 
of the Village in refusing to rezone. 
Although my consideration has been quite cursory, I 
perceive no merit to the argument now being pressed by respondents 
that one or more of these statues applies to the facts of this case. 
standing 
Although the courts below did not address the "standing" 
issue, raised by the Village, it is not an insubstantial issue under 
our decision in Warth v. Selvin. The individual respondents do not 
have standing under Warth. I was inclined to think, , when we 
granted cert, that Metropolitan Housing Corporation did have standing 
•. 
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as it had a contract to purchase (and lease) the fifteen-acre 
tract in question. It can be argued, therefore, that a denial 
of rezoning resulted in injury in fact. Petitioner asserts, how-
ever, that under Illinois law, a contract Rurchaser of real estate, 
whose contract is conditioned on rezoning (as in this case~ has 
no standing to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance, 
citing Clark Oil and Refining Corp. v. Evanston, 23 Ill. 2d 48. 
My clerk should take a look at this case, and determine its 
relevancy. 
* * * 
I believe the decision of CA7 is contrary to the great 
weight of authority at the circuit court and district court levels, 
and also is incompatible with several decisions of this Court. 
Respondent's brief contains little assistance in terms 
either of legal analysis or citation of authority. Moreover, peti-
tioner's reply brief makes a fairly strong showing that respondent's 
brief is inaccurate -- if not misleading -- in a number of respects. 
The case is worrisome because one must recognize the 
social and economic consequences of housing patterns that have 
long prevailed in this country. But in the absence of demonstrable 
discriminatory state action, the solution of the problem is for 
the legislative and executive branches. 
~tut:t aromt n tqt ~ttitt~ .itatt• 
-rudtitt:!lbttt. ~. ar. 2llc?,.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
/ 
j 
December 7, 1976 
Re: No. 75-616 - Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 
Dear Lewis: 
I have read your proposed opinion with interest. I think 
I am close to joining you, but I suggest the following for your 
cons ide ration: 
1. I must confess that I am troubled by Ransom 1 s standing. 
Perhaps what you have done is the best possible way to handle it. 
Ransom•s situation, however, is thin. He lived in a 3-person house-
hold, with his mother and son, and their combined income was 
apparently too high to qualify for Lincoln Green. He also testified 
(page 324 of the transcript) that he never really sought housing in 
Arlington Heights but that he would 11probably 11 move to Lincoln Green 
if it were built. I had hoped that plaintiff Maldonado would prove to 
be a better subject for standing, but my hopes are not fulfilled. I 
merely ask whether it would be better to go off on a jus tertii basis. 
Certainly Craig v. Boren might be supportive of this. 
2. I do not know whether the first part of the first sentence 
of footnote 4 on page 6 is helpful. Undoubtedly, there was a good 
reason for the change in district judges. The first was Judge Lynch, 
who has since died. 
3. I wonder about the accuracy of the first sentence of the 
second paragraph in footnote 8 on page 9. Could it be reworded to 
say, ••state law of standing does not govern such determinations in 
federal courts••? I suggest this because I think federal standing 
determinations can be controlled by state law as, for example, when 
state law defines whether or not there is a legal injury. 
(__ tr1 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~n:pumt Qiqmt of Urt ~tb i\tattg 
'Jhtgqi:ttghttt. J. <q. 2ll~Jl." 
December 9, 1976 
I 
Re: No. 75-616 -- Arlington Hei~hts v. Metropolitan 
Housing Deve opments Corp. 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall write separately in this case. I 
do not agree that the Court should reconsider the 
applicable standard and then do the fact-finding 
in the first instance. I also have doubts about 
standard you have fashioned. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 12/10/76 Arlington Heights (note 20, p. 17) 
20. Proof that the decision by the Village was 
motivated in party by a racially discriminatory purpose 
would not necessarily have required invalidation of the 
challenged decision. Such proof would, however, have 
shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the 
same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible 
purpose not been considered. If this were established, 
the complaining party in a case of this kind no longer 
fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper 
consideration of a discriminatory purposes. In such 
circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial 
interference with the challenged decision. But in this 
case respondents failed to make the required threshold 
showing. 
12. Proof that a decisionrnaking body was motivated 
in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not 
necessarily require ~~me&~ invalidation of the challenged 
in every case. 
decision/ But since respondents here failed to demonstaate 
that a ax£ discriminatory purpose was a factor in petitioners' 
decision, we have no occasion to determine what opportunity 
a defendant should be given,x~x~x~xexxkaxxaRxexxa~tixkea 
factor is established, to prove that the decision would 
have been xkexxamaxexeaxwixkEsxxexeR the same even if the 
impermissible purpose had not been considered. For a 
scholarly exploration of these questions, see Brest, 
Palmer v. Thompson!: An Approach to the Problem of 
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
95, 116-118. 
12/10/76 Arlinaton Heights ( ~ z () 
1 
p J ~ 
~I ~~~J .J..~ ~ lc.J-~ 
~-.. ~~1/~ 
in discriminatory purpose would not 
that the same decision would have resulted even had the 
impermissible purpose not been considered. If this could 
be established, the complaining party no longer fairly 
could attribute the injury complained of to the government's 
improper consideration of a racial purpose. In such 
circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial 
interference with the challenged decision~ The burden of 
proof, however, would shift to the governmental agency 





lfp/ss 12/10/76 Arlington Heights 
I ~ 
12. Proof that a decision-making body was motivated 
in part by a racially discriminatory purpose would not 
necessarily require invalidation of the challenged decision. 
It would,however, require the decision maker to establish 
that the same decision would have resulted even had the 
impermissible purpose not been considered. If this could 
be established, the complaining party no longer fairly 
could attribute the injury ~mplained of to the government's 
~ 
improper consideration of a racial purpose. In such 
circumstances, there would be no justification for judicial 
interference with the challenged decision. The burden of 
proof, however, would shift to the government al a~ncy~ 
~ 
once it is shown that a discriminatory purpose ~. 
12. Proof that a decisionmakim~ body was motivated in part by 
a racially discriminatory purpose would •ot ~~ require 
in~alidatio• of the challen~ed decisio • Rather, it would be open 
to the defendaats to show that the same decisio• would have resulted 
even if the 11\permissible purpose had not beell co•sidered. h 
t.<AA.0.e>v-f\ ·, cJe) 
some f fairly sbtpilt -"\~over•melllltal decisions, when other factors 
point stron~ly toward the outcome reached, such a showing might be 
--~ straightforward. But u the ki•d of multipurposed liwlrixioon11k•rxx 
decision legislators frequently make, balanci•~ a number of rather 
indistinct competi•g co•siderations, it would be difficult to 
tA-t.~~ 
establish that a•y single aa:hail!llsoel.t!actor was not of crucial impor-
tance. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem 
of U•constitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 
)e~~ -1Wv-
116-118. If the - ~v.Pnaeata~~could not dischar~e ~Aburden 
' 
of proof, then a findi•g would follow that but for the consideration 
of a constitutionally impermissible factor, the decisionmaker 
~l~ 
would •ot have tak~ th~/\actio• .  f':!.aint:i:ff ooxpl1li~ . But • 
~(YoM 
if ~TR ·~•stablis~ that the same decision would have resulted, 
of which 
the plaintiff could •o lon~er fairly attribute the i•jury/he complains 
to the government's improper consideration of a racial purpose. 
~r~ P. S. 
12/ 
- Proof that a decisionmaking body was motivated in part by 
a racially discriminatory purpose would not automatically require in-
validation of the challenged decision. Rather, it would be open to the 
decisionmaker to show that the same decision would have resulted even 
had the impermissible purpose not been considered. If this could be 
established-- and the governmental body would carry the burden of 
proof -- the plaintiff could no longer fairly attribute the injury he com-
plains of to the government's improper consideration of a racial purpose. 
In these circumstances the justification for judicial interference with 
government decisionmaking would disappear. But if the government 
could not discharge this burden of proof, then a finding would follow 
that but for the consideration of a constitutionally impermissible factor, 
the government would mt have taken the action of which plaintiff complains. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.ittpTtntt <!fourlof tltt 'J'nitt~ ,jtatts 
Jfag~ ~. ar. 2rt.;t'!~ 
December 14, 1976 
75-616, Arlington Hgts v. Metro Housing 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.in:p-rtntt Qfourlltf tJrt ~~ .ihdts 
J[M~ ~. <If. 2ll~'!$ 
December 14, 1976 
75-616, Arlington Hgts v. Metro Housing 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for the 
Court in this case. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~UFttnt <!flturi gf tift ,-m±tb ~tatt• 
jlhtslfinghm.:!D. C!J. 2llbi~$ 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
December 14, 1976 
Re: No. 75-616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, . 
~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~ftutt Qfourl of tlft ~b- JJfattg 
._-ultf.ttgt:Mt. ~. <If. 2ll.;t-".;t 
December / 76 
Re: No. 75-616 - Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your recirculation of December 14. 
Sincerely, 
--
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
~u:p-rmtt ~4lud 4lf tqt ~nittb ~tattl:l 
'JID'agqittgt4ltt, !D. ~· 20.?>1-.;t 
JUSTICEWM. J . BRE NNAN. JR. 
December 29, 1976 
., 
RE: No. 75-616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corporation 
Dear Byron:· 
I too would remand for the reasons stated in the first 
two paragraphs of your dissent. However, I have some reser-
vations about the third. Personally, I consider Lewis' 
opinion to be a useful discussion of techniques for linking 
discriminatory effect with discriminatory purpose, and con-
sequently would not want to imply that I disagree with the 
content of his discussion. Could you omit the third para-
graph? If not, I'll file a short statement indicating that 
I join paragraphs one and two of your opinion on the dis-
positional issue, while agreeing with Lewis' discussion of 
the 11 Subjects of proper inquiry .. that should guide the lower 
court on remand. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
C H AMBERS O F' 
..§upumt <!fquxt ttf tqt ~ttittb .,§tatts 
~asJringtqn. ~. <!f. ZO?'~~ 
JUSTIC E WM . J . BRENNAN. JR. 
December 29, 1976 
RE: No. 75-616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Development Corporation 
Dear Byron: 
I too would remand for the reasons stated in the first 
two paragraphs of your dissent. However, I have some reser-
vations about the third. Personally, I consider Lewis' 
( 
opinion to be a useful discussion of techniques for linking 
discriminatory effect with discriminatory purpose, and con-
sequently would not want to imply that I disagree with the 
content of his discussion. Could you omit the third para-
graph? If not, I'll file a short statement indicating that 
I join paragraphs one and two of your opinion on the dis-
positional issue, while agreeing with Lewis' discussion of 
the "subjects of proper inquiry" that should guide the lower 
court on remand. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
Ar hncrl-o r H P~h+s 
[Inc.. D~c. s 
I would suggest the following changes, none of which change 
the basic thrust of your opinion. 
(a) I am circulating an opLnLon in Mt. Healthy 
School Dist. Bd. v. Doyle 1 No. 75-1278, which discusses, albeit in a slLghtly different context, 
the standards of proof required in order to 
establish a constitutional violation based on 
an impermissible purpose. Because I would not 
want any arguable, if unwarranted, inference of 
tension between that opinion and yours in this 
case to be drawn, I would like to see your dis-
cussion of "substantial effect" modified to 
explicitly note that it does not decide what 
further proof standards might exist had a sub-
s~ial purpose been shown. The following two 
change~, think, would accomplish this. First, 
on page 2, rewrite the last full sentence to 
read: "But racial discrimination is not just 
another competing consideration." Second, on 
page 18, after the first sentence add the following 
footnote (numbered 21): 
21/ 
--Since respondents have failed to demonstrate 
that a discriminatory purpose was a substantial 
factor in the zoning decision, respondents 
ipso facto fail the Washington v. Davis stan-
dard. We need not determine what else respon-
dents might have been required to establish 
in order to make out a prima facie case of 
discrimination or what opportunity petitioners 
then should be given to rebut this prima facie 
case. 
(b) The first full paragraph on page 15 might be 
taken to mean that, apart from questions of 
privilege, trial testimony of decisionmakers is 
available on the same basis as other sources of 
legislative evidence. Because I believe our cases 
establish that the placing of a decisionrnaker on 
the stand, to probe his mental processes, is 
presumptively to be avoided, I would suggest the 
following additions. First, rewrite the second 
sentence to read: ~ "In some extraordinary in-
stances the members might be called to the stand 
at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the 
official action, although even then such testimony 
-2-
frequently will be barred by privilege." Second, 
add the following to the end of the first 
sentence of footnote 18: " ••• other branches 
of government ; and are 'not consonant with our 
scheme of government,' Tenney v. Brandhove, 
supra, at 377 , Placing a decisionmaker on the 
stand is, therefore, 'usually to be avoided,' 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 
U.S. , ; Un1te States v. Morgan, 
313 u.s. 409, 422 (194 
(c) As we have already discussed, I think the 
concluding paragraph of the opinion might profit-
ably be changed. I would suggest replacing the 
second sentence of that paragraph with the fol-
lowing: "They continue to urge here that a zon-
ing decision made by a public body may, and that 
petitioners' action here did, violate §§ ~ 3604 or 
3617." I would then rewirte the last sentence of 
the paragraph so that it reads: "We remand the 
case for further consideration of respondents' 
statutory claims." 
If you are able to make these changes, I would be 
happy to join your opinion. 
CHAMBERS Or 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu:p-rtutt Qfltud of tqt ~nitt~ .itatts 
~asJringhm. ~. <!f. 20:,?Jl.$ 
January 3, 1977 
Re: 75-616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation 
Dear Lewis: 
I am generally with you on the merits here, 
but it seems that Byron makes a pretty good case for 
remand rather than final decisions here. I assume you 
considered his view before you wrote. At your convenience 
can you give me a call on this? 
Regards, 
{/il3 




THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.Ju;vrtmt <!J~ud ~f tlft ~ttittb .itatte 
'J)'ae4inghm. ~. <q:. 20.?){.~ 
January 6, 1977 
/ 
Re: 75- 616 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corporation 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
January 7, 1977 
~\" 
Dear,;'' Mr. Putzel: 
I~ ,, 
c The line-up in the 
} 'I 
Powell, ~J~, delivered the opinion of the Court,~, in which 
'". ' __ iJ;_l" ''-'\{J.' 
BUrger, c.J., 
i.jo.,, n 
and Stewart, Blackmun and Rebnquist, JJ, join. 
J;;-1 
Marshall ,:z:·J · • filed an opinion concurring in Parts :1-111 
' "";. 
and dissenting from the result, in which Brennan, J. ~ joined. 
Whi~e , ·~·~ :~,~ filed .. a ~ 'dissenting opinion.c . Stevens"; :'J ,:"; took ·!.' 
' "' 
he consideration or decision of the case. 
.,, 
lfp/ss 1/10/77 75-616 Villagp of Arlington Heights v. 
- Metroh-<itan Housing Development 
The Respondent, a housing corporation, desired to 
uild - in the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, 
a town house complex/ for low and moderate income tenants. 
The Village, a suburb of Chicago, is zoned largely for 
single family homes. Its population is predominantly white. 
Respondent negotiated a purchase agreement, covering 
a 15-acre site, upon which it proposed to construct the 
project. But the Village authorities ~~~~~ 
"' and, the V;ilJs.se-~aasd of Trus&ees - refused to rezone the 
property from single-family/to~ milti-family clas sification. 
Respondent, joined by individuals, instituted this 
suit in an Illinois District Court. They alleged that the 
refusal to rezone was racially discriminatory, violating 
the Fourteenth Amendmentj and the Federal Fa~r Housing Act. 
Following trial, the District Court entered judgment 
for the Village, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit reversed. Looking solely to the "ultimate effect" 
) 
the Circuit Court viewed the denial to rezone as 
discriminatory. 
In Washington v. Davis, decided last Term, we held 
that official action is not invali;tsolely because it 
~~·.y' . ~~~ ~.Gt 
'\result! l.n a "disproportionate effect. gr j mplil'1ot. A Proof 
of • discriminatory intent is required to show a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
In this case, the District Court found;lthat the refusal 
to rezone~as based on legitimate ~-~e consideration(,;' 
and was not racially motivated. The Court of Appeals -agreed with this finding, but nevertheless held that the 
"effect" of the refusal-fa.s determinative. 
As this is not in accord with our ~Q&&at decision in 
Washington v. Davis, we reverse the decision of the Court 
of Appeals. 
We remand the case for consiperation of the Fair 
I - If;.,~ ••'"-" --H~sing Act claim, wbi sb atrJR.SI\ not resolved by the Court 
of Appeals. 
Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Mr. Justice Brennan, 
has filed an opinion concurring in~~a ~I 
~dissenting ~~~~-t. Mr. Justice White filed 
a dissenting opinion. 
Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration 











































































































































































i'u.vumt ~ou.rt of t~t ~nittlt ;%tlrlts 
~as£rit4l1ctt.18. ~· 21lp'l·~ 
CHAM BERS OF" 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
January 21, 1977 f\LE. coP'f 
-PLEASE RETURN 
10 f\LE 
Case held for No. 75-616, Arlington Heights 
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 75-1002, Joseph Skilken & Co. v. City of Toledo 
Petitioner Skilken, a developer, arranged with the local 
housing authority to build three federally subsidized Turnkey 
III public housing projects on various sites throughout 
Toledo, outside of the areas of high minority concentration. 
Before it could proceed it had to petition the city council 
for rezoning of one site, Heatherdown, and it had to obtain 
from the plan commission platting approval at the other two 
sites. Apparently, similar requests in the areas involved 
(albeit not for public housing) had generally been approved, 
and in fact the plan commission gave preliminary platting 
approval at one site. Then word got out that Skilken proposed 
to build public housing, and the reaction from residents of 
nearby areas was strong. After hearings, the relevant 
authorities denied rezoning and platting approval. In the 
process they rescinded the preliminary approval given for 
one of the sites. 
Skilken, joined by the housing authority and two 
individual minority plaintiffs, sued the city and several 
of its officials, alleging that the city's actions were 
racially motivated. They charged violations of §§ 1981, 1982 and 
1983, the Fair Housing Act of 1968, and the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The DC found that the city's actions 
were racially motivated, but, confusingly, the DC also spoke 
at times as though its only important finding was a finding 




permit construction at the three sites. It further ordered 
that the city file within 90 days a comprehensive plan "to 
eliminate discriminatory barriers in the total housing 
supply." This order was apparently based on a rather muted 
finding that the city had engaged in a consistent pattern of 
discrimination with respect to public housing, causing nearly 
all of it to be located in the areas of the city with a heavy 
minority concentration. It is not clear whether the DC's 
action is based on statutory or constitutional grounds. 
CA6 (Weick, Miles (DJ); Phillips, concurring in the 
result), reversed in an opinion that is not easy to follow. 
Without explicitly stating that any of the DC's findings were 
clearly erroneous, it expressed strong disapproval of the 
order for the city to come up with a comprehensive plan. It 
then vacated and remanded with resgect to the two denials of 
platting approval, because the DC 'did not give adequate 
consideration to the nonracial reasons stated by the Plan 
Commission and the City Council," and did not consider "the 
rights of these areas' property owners who opposed the 
platting." CA6 reversed outright and ordered dismissal of 
the complaint with respect to Heatherdown'srezoning, , apparently 
because it thought that ordering rezoning amounted to usurping 
the local legislative powers. Petitioners based their suit 
on a charge of racially discriminatory motivation, and the 
DC held for them, at least in -part, on this basis. It is not 
clear to what extent the CA reversal represents a disagreement 
with this factual finding. 
In any event, the DC's decision on remand with regard 
to the two sites denied platting approval should proceed in 
accordance with the guidelines set forth in Arlington Heights. 
Those guidelines call for a somewhat different inquiry from 
what CA6 has mandated. - In addition, the order of dismissal 
with respect to Heatherdown. was probably erroneous. It too 
should be reconsidered in light of Arlington Heights. I will 
vote to grant, vacate and remand to permit that reconsideration. 
Petitioners have also pressed their claim that the DC 
was correct in entering its broad remedial order. The CA 
seems ~ to ~ have thought that such orders were permissible only 
in school desegregation cases. Hills -v. Gautreaux, 44 L.W. 
4480, should disabuse them of that notion. Although I have 
strong doubts whether such relief was appropriate on the facts 
of this case, the CA apparently acted on a sweeping and erroneous 
basis. I recommend that any remand also specify reconsideration 









L. F. P. , Jr. 
75-616 Village of Arlington Heights 
This memorandum will comment on your draft 
opinion of 11/16, that I have found quite interesting. 
For the most part my comments are general rather than 
specific, as I would like for you to put portions of 
the opinion through a second draft. You can do this 
much better than I. 
1. You will note some editorial changes, 
primarily on the first twenty pages. No "editing" at 
this stage is final, and editorial improvement by you 
and your colleague "editor" -- will of course be welcomed. 
2. Part I looks fine, subject to the limited 
editing I have suggested. 
3. Part II, dealing with standing, is excellent. 
Apart from quite minor editing, I see no need for change. 
4. I would like for you to rewrite most of 
Part III, primarily with the view to condensing it to 
about half its present length. Try writing it with the 
conciseness and specificity of a Law Review note. 
* * * 
I now make some specific observations that 
may afford some guidance. 
PP 22, 23. On these pages, you summarize the 
teaching of our prior cases, noting that circumstantial 
evidence may compel a finding of purpose, and that even 
a single action may be so invidious as to violate Equal 
Protection. It is important to distill and state the 
principles that may be deduced from prior cases. Perhaps 
this could be done more concisely. 
I suggest greater reliance on Washington v. 
Davis, possibly quoting from it in the text or a note. 
PP. 23-26. In these pages you were identifying 
relevant evidence or considerations. The points made 
included: (i) that "ultimate effect" is an "important 
starting point", but effect alone is rarely determinative. 
(P. 23); (ii) that the "sequence of events" leading to 
an official decision may shed light (PP. 23, 24); (iii) 
that the sequence of events may be viewed in a "broader 
sense", citing Mulkey (P. 24); (iv) that direct evidence 
in the form of contemporary statements by officials may 
be relevant (PP. 25, 26); (v) that direct testimony by 
2. 
3. 
"decision makers" (legislators) may be helpful, but there 
are various negatives as well as constitutional constraints 
(26, 27). 
I have no disagreement with any of the fore-
going, although my impression is that the relevant 
considerations can be summarized quite concisely. Some 
also are almost too obvious to state, ~' contemporary 
statements by officials. 
Two pages (26, 27) are devoted to the possible 
relevancy and admissibility of testimony by the decision-
makers. What you have written is excellent, and would 
be entirely suitable for a Law Review. I think the 
substance should be included in our opinion, but in 
condensed form and possibly relegated to a footnote. 
The "awesome" paragraph on p. 28 can be omitted. 
5. Subpart D of Part III decides the case. 
The principles identified earlier in the opinion are 
applied to the facts. 
At first reading, this part of the opinion seems 
a bit thin. After stating that the courts below made no 
finding of discriminatory purpose or intent, the draft 
simply states that we have reviewed the evidence, and 
find no basis for overturning the findings of the courts 
below. At this point, at least there should be a footnote 
4. 
reference back to the discussion of the evidence in 
Part I. As an alternative, consider the possibility of 
amplifying that paragraph by summarizing in a few 
sentences the more pertinent evidentiary facts: this 
property had been zoned R-3 since 1959; it was virtually 
surrounded by single family homes; the owners of these 
homes had built or purchased them in reliance on the 
single family residence classification; the proposed 
rezoning would cause a diminishment of property values; 
the purpose of R-5 zoning was to serve as a buffer between 
single family development and commercial or manufacturing 
land use, a purpose that would not be served by rezoning 
the Lincoln Green tract to R-5. 
Thus, not only was there no substantial evidence 
of discriminatory purpose or intent; there was rather strong 
affirmative evidence to the contrary. 
I am not entirely sure that a summary (along 
the foregoing lines) is desirable in this final section. 
But it might be helpful to give it a try, and see how 
it looks. 
6. Although I have not examined all of the 
footnotes critically, they seem generally to be in good 
shape. I do suggest that you ask yourself, with respect 
to each, whether (i) the note serves a clarifying or 
other useful purpose, and (ii) whether, in the case of 
several of the longer notes, they could be condensed 
without impairing their usefulness. I shy away from 
too much dicta or free wheeling in notes. 
* * * 
I am not on any crusade for shorter opinions 
and less fullsome footnotes. I do think the Court is 
fairly subject to some criticism (not all of it) on 
account of the length of our opinions and the multiplicity 
of the notes. What our critics sometimes overlook is 
that we are the Supreme Court; we have a responsibility 
to make law as well as decide particular controversies, 
and this requires careful analysis and appropriate 
elaboration. such an opinion can and should be different 
from an essay or Law Review article. 
I add these comments for the benefit of all 
of us, including particularly myself. Your draft is not 
fairly subject to this general criticism. 
* * * 
Now, as to the next steps for this opinion: 
please write a fresh draft of Subpart A of Part III. You 
might also make such changes in Subpart B thereof as you 
think desirable. 
5. 
Meanwhile, one of the secretaries can recopy 
the few pages in your first draft that I have edited 
substantially. This will give us a relatively clean 
copy of the first twenty pages. 
It would be extremely helpful if you could 
give me the revised Part III by Saturday morning. I 
would then be able to get this back to you by Monday, 
with the hope that it could go to your "editor" early 
next week, and possibly to the printer for a Chambers 
draft before Thanksgiving. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
6. 
. ~ . 
LFP/lab 11/17/76 
To: Dave Martin 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
75-616 Village of Arlington Heights 
This memorandum will comment on your draft 
opinion of 11/16, that I have fouo.d quite interesting. 
For the most part my c011111ents are general rather than 
specific, as I would like for you to put portions of 
the opinion through a second draft. You can do this 
much better than I. 
1. You will note some editorial changes, 
primarily on the first twenty pages. No "editing" at 
this stage is final, and editorial ~provement by you --
and your colleague "editor" -- will of course be welcomed. 
2. Part I looks fine, subject to the l~ited 
editing I have suggested. 
3. Part II, dealing with standing, is excellent. 
Apart from quite minor editing, I see no need for change. 
4. I would like for you to rewrite most of 
Part III, primarily with the view to condensing it to 
about half its present length. Try writing it with the 
conciseness and specificity of a Law Review note • 
•. 
* 
I now make some specific observations that 
may afford some guidance. 
PP 22 1 23. On these pages, you summarize the 
teaching of our prior cases, noting that circumstantial 
evidence may compel a finding of purpose, and that even ~ 
a single action may be so invidious as to violate Equal 
,Protection. It is important to distill and state the 
principles that may be deduced from prior cases. Perhaps 
this could be done more concisely. 
I suggest greater reliance on Washington v. 
Davis, possibly quoting from it in the text or a note. 
PP. 23-26. In these pages you were identifying 
relevant evidence or cons ide rations. The points made 
included~' (i) that "ultimate effect'' is an "important 
starting point", but effect alone is rarely determinative. 
(P. 23); (ii) tbat the "sequence of events" leading to 
an official decision may shed light (PP. 23, 24); (iii) 
that the sequence of events may be .viewed in a "broader 
sense", citing Mulkey (P. 24); (iv) that direct evidence 
in the fo~ of contemporary statements by officials may 
be relevant (PP. 25, 26); (v) that direct testimony by 
2. 
I have no disagreement with any of the fore-
going, although my impression is that the relevant 
considerations can be summarized quite concisely. Some 
also are a~st too obvious to state, ~, contemporary 
statements by officials. 
Two pages (26, 27) are devoted to the possible 
relevancy and admissibility of testimony by the decision-
makers. What you have written is excellent, and would 
be entirely suitable for a Law Review. I think the 
substance should be included in our opinion, but in 
condensed form and possibly relegated to a footnote, 
3. 
The "awesome" paragraph on p. 28 can be omitted. 
5. Subpart D of Part III decides the case .• 
The principles identified earlier in the opinion are 
applied to the facts. 
At first reading, this part of the opinion seems 
a .bit thin. After stating that the courts below made no 
finding of discr~inatory purpose or intent, the draft 
s~ply states that we have reviewed the evidence, and 
find no basis for overturning the findings of the courts 




' . !'~ ,. 
reference back to the discussion of the evidence in 
Part I ; As an alternative, consider the possibility of ~ 
amplifying that paragraph by suumarizing in a few ' ., 
sentences the more pertinent evidentiary facts: this 
~ property had bee·n zoned B.-3 since 1959; it was virtually 
surrounded by single family homes; the owners of these 
4. 
homes had built or purchased them in reliance on the 
single family residence classification; the proposed 
rezoning would cause a dLminishment of property values; 
·the purpose of R-5 zoning was to serve as a buffer between 
single family development and commercial or manufacturing 
·.land use, a purpose that would not be sened by rezoning 
the Lincoln Green tract to R-5. 
Thus, not only was there no substantial evidence 
·of discriminatory purpose or intent; there was rather strong 
~ 
affirmative evidence to the contrary. 
am not entirely sure that a sUDID8ry (along . · 
' the foregoing lines) is desirable in this final section. 
But it might be helpful to give it a try, and see how 
looks. 
6. Although I have not examined all of the 
footnotes critically., they seem generally to be in good 
shape. I do suggest that you ask yourself, with respect 
to each, whether (1} the note serves a clarifying or ';, 
other useful purpose, and (ii) whether, in the case of 
5. 
several of the longer notes, they could be condensed 
without impairing their usefulness, I shy away from . 
too much dicta or free wheeling in notes. 
* * * 
on any crusade for shorter opinions 
and less fullsome footnotes. I do think the Court is 
fairly subject to some criticism (not' all of it) on 
account of the length of our opinions and the multiplicity 
o~ the notes. What our critics sometimes overlook is 
that we .!!.!. the Supreme Court; we have a responsibility 
·to make law as well as decide particular controversies, 
and this requires careful analysis and appropriate 
elaboration. Such an opinion can and should be different 
from an essay or Law Review article. 
,I add these comments for the benefit of all 
of us, including particularly myself. Your draft is not 
fairly subject to this general criticism. 
* * * 
Now, as to the next steps for this opinion: 
please write a fresh draft of Subpart A of Part III. You 
might also make such changes in Subpart B thereof as you 
think desirable. 
l' 
v ·>" Meanwhile, one of the secretaries can recopy 
the few pages in your first draft that I have edited 
substantially. :,This will give us a relatively clean 
copy of the first twenty pages. 
·:. I~ , ~ould be extremely helpful if you could 
give me the revised Part III by Saturday morning. '". I 
would then be able to get this back to you by Monday, 
with the hope that it could go to your "editor" early 
next ,week, and possibly to the printer for a Chambers 






To: Mr. Justice Powell October 11, 1976 
From: Dave Martin 
No. 75-616, Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
Development Corp., et al. 
This is in many respects a sensitive case. Zoning has often 
been used with the decided effect, if not the purpose, of 
fostering racially segregated housing patterns. Here a 
suburb with less than 1% black population refused to rezone 
a tract to accommodate what seems to be a well-designed, 
unoffensive townhouse development. The development would 
have been within reach of low- and moderate-income families, 
' and showed promise of axxxagkiRgxa creating a reasonably 
integrated townhouse community. 
I conclude that respondent MHDC has standing, that CA7 
was wrong in its constitutional conclusion, and that the 
Fair Housing Act questions are not presented here and should 
not be decided. 
Standing 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, presented a standing question 
somewhat similar to that here. Allf plaintiffs there were found 
to lack standing, but the g Court e~kaxixeaxxkaxxHKHailJxkke 
intimated that litigants who surmoun~the standing barrier will 
be those who focus on a particular project. Id. at 508 n. 18, -
516. Here MHDC clearly had a specific project in the works. 
It sought clearance through the normal channels and brought 
suit only when those efforts failed. It would lack standing 
only if,-. like f Penfield Better Homes in Warth, its project 
-2-
was no longer viable at the time the suit was filed. These 
are the relevant dates: Jan. 29, 1971, MHDC petitioned for 
xa~ rezoning. March, April, and June, 1971, public hearings 
on the proposal. Sept. 28, 1971, final decision by the 
Arlington Heights Board rejecting the rezoning. Jure 12, 1972, 
complaint filed. 
Penfield Better Homes' project was denied in 1969, and 
the 'ts Warth lawsuit was filed in 1972. The Court siid 
that it was possible that Better Homes had standing in 1969, 
"or within a reasonable time thereafter" to seek review of 
~ "1.. cJ ..t.) "-'\ S'l7. 
the towns action.~But plaintiffs there had failed to allege 
that the project remained viable at the time xskax the complait 
was filed, and nothing in the record suggested that a live 
dispute survived into 1972. The real uestion here is whether 
the nine months MHDC waited to file suit constitutes a --"reasonable time thereafter," since MHDC did not allege 
or put on specific proof as to continued viability. 
I think the time was reasonable. The complaint reveals 
;"' t:X~ v.J...--sv,;~~ ~c-k.tr~~ si~~ 
that MHDC tr e to cooperate with local officials after 
rejection of rezoning at the St. Viator's property.• 6~-a 
etsher swi~a-ele rnopu!'ey .. It also indicates that the Village 
Board had a Study Committee on Low-Moderate Income Housing 
which reported to the Board in March, 1972, 
development of 150 to 250 
of these ongoing efforts, and in the absence of any real 
indication that the project xamaiRaaxxiakia lost viability, 
I do not think nine months was an unreasonable delay. 







The DC opinion ax (Petn. at B6-B7) suggests another deficiency. 
-3-
The project MHDC intended to build required supplemental federal 
funding under Section 236. The DC noted that by the time it 
decided the case (February 1974), Section 236 funds had been 
impounded by the executive branch. Petitioner suggests that 
this deprives MHDC of standing, but I think this contention 
confuses mootness and standing doctrine. The relevant inquiry 
\ for standing purposes should be the project's viability at the 
time the complaint is filed. As I understand it, Section 236 
funds were not impounded until late 1972 or early 1973, in 
the wave of impoundmants that greeted President Nixon's 
ree1Etion. These impoundments were hotly disputed in the 
courts for several months thereafter. The point is that 
the funds were still ostensibly available in June of 1972. 
(I have not verified the dates of the impoundments; if that 
information is crucial, let me know and I will check it.) A(~ 
Petitioner also suggests that under Illinois law respondent 
MHDC lacks standing, and cites Clark Oil and Refining Corp. 
v. Evanston, 23 Ill.2d 48. The plaintiff there entered into 
a contract to purchase land for use as a gas station. The 
contract was contingent on securing rezoning. Noting that 
plaintiff had no present possessory interest, and that it was 
not really hurt if it never secured rezoning (the contract wouad 
simply be' rescinded), the Illinois court held that plaiatiff 
lacked standingJ io cLJI~ -. 2o"'i~ ~oArJ d-ecisiD"'\ ~"' -k !ll;~o•'s ~""~· 
I do not think Clark Oil controls here. That was a commercial 
\ If\ OW" ~""'· 
setting, and the constellation of interests are differentA~,.~~ 
MHDC is not s~ply trying to make money. It wants to put up 
..____ - te.lcd-llft(y 
good quality low- and moderate-income housing in theAsegregate~d 
-4-
suburbs. Moreover, if it loses the St. Viator's property, 
it probably cannot find an equally attractive purchase 
elsewhere. In fact, the key to the ~litigation seems to 
be that St.Viator's was subsidizing the a effort through an 
HR especially low sales price. Without that subsidy, MHDC 
ma~XR8kx»exa~le is apparently unable to put up the kind of 
housing it wants within the low- to moderate-income range. 
I have found no Illinois case that relates to this kind of 
nonprofitf setting, and petitioner cites none. 
Clark Oil is thus fairly easily distinguishable, but in 
any event I see no reason why state standing doctrine should 
control access to federal courts. The Article III requirements 
and the general prudential concerns which have shaped 
standing doctrine in this eourt are peculiarly federal matters. 
If Illinois wants to restrict zoning litigation to owners 
and immediate 
or others with clear/possessory interests, its desires do 
not necessarily carry over into the federal system. I 
think MHDC ha!? shown injury in fact. 
:r~ X .-. .,.,·r. *; ......w,, 4ltt....o~o~~;~ 
~Agets MHDC over the ititial Article III hurdle, and 
MHDC can assert its own rights to be free from arbitrary 
zoning under Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365. But that 
is obvious)y not the heart of the controversy, and ~exixi~Rexx 
Arlington Heights clearly prevails under Euclid. MHDC wants 
to complain about action allegedly motivated by racial 
discrimination. In this, as a constitutional matter, it 
must be said that MHDC asserts the rights of thtrd parties: 
those nonwhites who would move in to Linc$ln Green,. saa 'iR9 ~,. 




racially discriminatory motives. Whether ~kcan assert 
these third party rights is a close question. The precedents 
give no clear guidance. 
It would be fairly easy to find that MHDC cannot assert 
third-party rights. Under the plurality view in Singleton v . ......____ 
Wulff (July 1, 1976), MHDC loses under the first test: there 
is no confidential relationship approaching that between 
doctor and patient. Nor are there .-.. practical concerns 
like a desire for anonymity or the certainty of imminent 
,).,·,~ 
technical mootness which might ~Athe v~ctims of the racially 
discriminatory action from bringing their own suit. 
But ±fx8RKxMx under your approach in Singleton, and taking 
a more rellistic view of the obstacles facing black;-victims 
of discriminatory action, I would argue that MHDC should be 
permitted to assert the third-party rights. In the first place, 
I think the concept of'tlirect :illlli interdiction" should be 
broad enough to include this case. Unlike the doctors in ~ingleto~ 
MHDC is not simply out of pocket a bit more if petitioner's 
~k$'+-..J. 
decision stands up. It is)\absolutely barred from building the 
housing it wants. If it goes ahead to break ground, I presume 
it is subject to injunction. If it still persists, I 
it and 
presume/its officers and employees are subject to contempt 
sanctions . 
Secondly, in an important sense, li~igation of the third 
Lfr~~J ~,( 
parties' rights is in all p au&teahttJEerrns imposs~ble without 
the action of someone like MHDC who will go to the trouble to 
put together a specific project. Arlington Heights adopted its 
zoning ordinance in 1959. If it could be proved that ~~ 
ordinance was motivated by a desire to keep out blacks, then 
(1\.:.'i ,,.:k /e .. st
1 





xx~would be declared invalid, and presumably the court would 
create a remedy to dissipate the unconstitutional results. 
:~s.u. 
But for someone to litigate thatf-now, he would have to demonstrate 
standing &I i by pointing to a specific project or building 
or house iR:KB191'hitdmiMtBHIHian•mmnuw which would be built 
absent the ordinance und into which he would move. Or--and 
this is the more likely scenario now that the 1959 adoption is 
history--Arlington Heights might be turning down all new 
rezoning proposals ~e£auxexafxxa£ialxmaxxxaxiaH for racially 
discriminatory purposes. But .. again no individual could 
challenge this policy until someone put together a specific 
proposal presented to the Board. In each instance the individuals 
are dependent on the actions of a developer •. More importantly, - '('~~.'\ 
even when such a project exists, there ... ~evere problems 
in proving that an individual would probably move into 
the completed project. For any project in litigation, 
fltNwl~ +o ~ i~-h> &~ ~ ~ewf.:tiiv~ pv-o,itc.f 
completion is many years away, and futureA~vee ef ~ka~ ee~ 
~"""\ 
can not be demonstrated with much •• iaa· • certainty. 
"-" 
To these reasons t 1 1 1 •tHM.e (which I confess are 
the 
defmnitely arguable extrapolations ofASingleton dissent) I 
add one more. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257, in 
language quoted with approval in the Singleton dissent, found 
the general rule against asserting third parties' rights 
outweighed by" the need to protect fundamental rights." 
as in Barrows 
The same fundamental rights/are at stake here. As a practical 
matter they can only be protected if a developer with a 
particular proposal is in the picture. I think it makes 
sense to let the developer assert them himself in his own 
action. 
-7-
pro~f were defective under Warth standards. (xf The case 
went to trial before Warth.) The local community organization\ 
Northwest Opportunity Center, fails for similar reasons. 
It has demonstrated no injury in fact to xi itself or its 
members, insofar as the constitutional claim;r is concerned. 
The Fair Housing Act is a different matter. 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 
205, held that the Act extends standing to a very broad 
class of persons who come within the statutory definition 
.i.·.!·) "C~J"" 
of "persons aggrieved-l" who claims to have been 
in~ured by a discriminatory housing practice or who believes 
that he will be irrevocably injured by a discriminatory housing 
practice that is about to occur ••• "42 U.S.C. § 3610(a).) 
MHDC clearly qualifies. Some of the others might also. 
The Constitutional Issue 
The rationale nf 7 ':'l. adopted by CA 7 is not easy to follow, 
but I think it must be said that CA7 passed only on the 
constitutional issues aRRXR~xxaRxkkH~ (specifically under 
J:t' the ourteenth Amendment) and not on the Fair Housing Act 
claims. The suit was brought under that act and §§1981, 1982, 
and 1983, as well as directly under the Fourteenth Amendment. r;, fir~"'~ i+ wil\ tH. \Ue~ -+o ~y 'fa ~e..s~ CA7's /.'""-« •f n:aS'~~· 
AvA7 first accepted the DC's finding that there was no racially 
discriminatory purpose animating the refusal to rezone. Then 
it apparently accepted the finding that there was no discriminatory 
-8-
effect, citing James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, despite the 
fact that knocking out low-income housing would have a 
~ ~ k.,w.w-e.r, 
disproportionate effect on minorities. Ai at i& went onJ and 
Colll<Sf\~*'~ violation A. 
finally found a ai.S£xKmXRa .I!IX~XI! 1!£X based on "historical 
context and ultimate effect." It took note of the strikingly .... .._.. ~ 
segregated housing pattern in the northwest Chicago area. 
And it found that the ultimate effect would be that no 
Section 236 housing would be built in Arlington Heights, since 
there were no suitable alternative sites. This meant the 
Village killed a chance to increase its minority population 
by 1000 percent. In addition, although Arlington Heights 
"did not directly create the problem," it was not 
entitled to ignore the problem. The village was likened 
to the builder in Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.~501 
(CA .., "?tf) ~. ~~I"'' v.s. 10 10, 
F.2d 32~,~wkex~xxkex.s who, taking plaintiff's case there at 
its strongest,"exploited" the segregated housing market to 
make excessive profits from black bu~ers. 
From this reasoning the E~Hr..Kx£X£SR court concluded that 
I 
Arlington Heights' action could be sustained only if based 
on compelling interests. Clearly the stated interests--
integrity of the zoning plan (using multifamily units only 
as buffers against industrial and comme~al developments) 
and protecting property values--could not pass that stringent 
test. 
A. It is hard to put before you strong arguments .._ in 
support of CA7's decision. Analytically it seems to amount 
to a sleight of hand. The DC is approved: there is no 
forbidden purpose or effect. But suddenly, with talk of 
'(ultimate effect'" and "exploitation;' the village is put to the 
-9-
compelling interest. test. 
In the long run, however, there is something to be said 
often 
for what the court did. Zoning ordinances have/been ~Hkxka 
xke used to excluae racial minorities. When the g±k¥ govern-
ment acts thus, the action~---- is more offensive and 
damaging than when private parties discriminate. But when the 
government takes an action a for discriminatory reasons, it 
-+o ~U~ 
is often less accessible~than comparable actions by private 
individuals. Under Washington v. Davis (June 7, 1976), govern-
ment action will not be struck down--on constitutional grounds--
because of discriminatory effect. • Bad purpose must 
be shown. And yet, for a number of good reasons, courts 
kaxexxex±xxeax since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, have 
resisted -..intrusive inquiryf into legislative motivation. -- .... 
Under 
decision. And almost any zoning action, no matter how 
suspicious-looking, can also claim some kind of rational 
basis such as preserving property values. Zoning case law 
is, in some respects, !lfi' b tailor-made to permit the e "ins" 
an impenetrable cover for keeping the "outs" out.!/Perhaps on 
income lines this is tolerable. But on racial lines it is 
not. Zoning could be ~~important factor in propelling 
Jrh:&::i:x llihi c h ) 
us toward the society against wk±k~the Kerner Commission 
warned: two separate nations, one black, one white. Unless 
courts open their eyes to what nearly all others can see, 
such results are facilitated. (1 N. Williams, American Land 
-10-
Planning Law~&Jiens 85-111, contain~s some useful xkaHgkx.s:--
._ LJH\\A""t<J 
if slightly slanted--thoughts on this. -.Aargues that Euclidean 
deference to local agencies has gone too far, in disregard of 
the _.powerful exclusionary potential of the zoning tool. 
A number of state courts, notably New f Jersey, are ushering 
in a new era of heightened scrutiny, largely by interpretation 
of the "general welfare" requirements under state constitutions.) 
That argument contains 
1 
B. The general argument offered above in support of CA7 
ultimately will not wash. !ka.s:axaxe/reasons for permitting 
asxaa.s:iax plaintiffs an easier prima facie «a.s:a showing of 
;t 
bad motive. But ~~really cannot carry the day in the face 
of an approved and explicit finding that there was no 
discriminatory purpose. Arlington Heights has so few 
minority residents that one still may be uneasy about the 
finding. But this was a refusal to rezone, not a hurry-up -------'-"'"""" 
effort to place a multi-family area int a park zone for the 
first time, therebv to block a proposed low-income development. 
Cf. Kenneda Park Homes v. Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (CA2 1970)6l 
cert denie , 401 U.S. 1010; CA.rt ~~J '/2-'L v.s. lol/2-· 
AUnited Staas v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 1 ~ Arlington Heights 
on the property 
had called for single-family development/long before anyone 
proposed Lincoln Green. 
All ,then, 
~/we really have/is a refusal to permit low-income 
housing, a refusal explainable on rational grounds. Valtierra, 
&./os-u.s. rJ.) ~'' v . .s. 1, 
Lindsey v. Normet,.kand Rodriguez,Ashould govern. 
One last thought leads in to considering the statutory 
&RRRR«&a Zoning powers do carry great potential for subtly 
perpetuating or worsening residential segregation. I think 
the way should be open for Congress to change the lttigation 
-11-
burdens somewhat, in pursuance of its enforcement powers under 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. What I have in 
mind is something like the.,. •• shift in burden of proof 
upon a prima facie showing under Title VII, as in Griggs v. 
Power Co • '{II 
DukeJ 401 U.S. ~Zo/, and McDonnell Douglas v. Green,~~ U.S. 
7 Cf .2. This might be coupled with a i?f ;::;;;r&:;s'4~~cation 
.._ that a · · l rather modest showing will constitute a 
prima facie case, of the kind Congress attempted in tre 
religious axi discrimination provision at issue in Parker 
Seal. Washington v. Davis, drawing a sharp distinction 
between constitutional claims ana statutory claims, supports 
t~viewJ ~ ~ "'-..$ ~~ k.;w{ ~ ~~e~ ~v-,·y. 
If Congress passes such legislation, there is some' danger 
that courts, at least in some communities, will wind up 
sitting as glorified zoning boards of appeals. But4J if 
\A)()~~ 
problem ofAresidential segregation warrants such action, 
if Congress wills it, then~hat should not be disturbing. 
,jiAL4eiiA{ 







end it. The problem with.._ CAl's decision here is that 
precipi~es the courts into that role on a very thin foundation, 
and there is little way that Congress or an aroused public 
it 
d~ 
can pull the courts ou~ once such widespread review begins as 
a constitutional matter. 
Fair Housing Act 
The major remaining question is whether Congress has 
already established Title Vii-like bnrden-shifting rules in 
the Fair Housing Act. A superficial look at the language 
of the statute suggests that it has not, but one must keep 
in mind that Griggs and McDonnell Douglas construed provisions 
~~t:~ 
which on their faces likewise did not ·•••Aburden of proof. 
None of the language of the Fair Housing Act deals explicitty 
S.u. o.lse> 
;~. § 3f.l7. -
-12-
~'Uj 
with zoning decisions. Some of the language i~~broad enough 
ta thsas ts 11G ts l · st sf shtftt g tardeZEw 
to res ondents comes 1 
360 (a), making it unlawful ~''!~Jo 
refuse to sell or rent • . • or otherwise make unavailable 
or deny, a sew dwelling to any person because of race, color, 
..... ~ .C:......\ (.~""'""' of s 3"0'! (~) 
religion, or national origin." ButA•' m!.x~x.s:.tut:.Kii!!Rx.s:ugge.s:x.s: 
\; \u.. ~ -C\wl:~ w...-.e, 
1 3 3 , suggests that an explicit finding>Aof no racially 
discriminatory motivation would also defeat a Fair Housing 
Act claim. 
cites 
CA7 MeRKif!IR.S:/the leading case for application of the Act 
to._ •• zoning practices, United States v. Black Jack, ~~~A) 
508 F.2d 1179. That case establishes a kind of burden-shifting 
procedure roughly like Griggs and McDonnell Douglas, although I. find its analysis not very helpful. There I may be the 
kernel of a workable statutory interpretation there, but it 
is not well developed. BlackJrack builds on Williams v. 
tart ~CZ, "''' u.s. I 02.1, 102.7,.~ 
Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (CAB 1974),Awhich does a good \ 
'' Me :bo lo\1111-l 
job of applying the notion of prima facie case (as in flppg) 
A. 
to discrimination by a private developer. But the Black Jack 
court jl J ·jumps too quickly to a compelling interest 
under 
test/which any municipality is I 3 2$ likely to lose. 
My ultimate point ~ere is that this is not a good case 
to construe the Fair Housing Act as applied to zoning decisions. 
More importantly, I think the question is not 
before .... us. CA7 touched on some Fair Housing Act questions, -
but its decision, fairly read, goes off on constitutional --- --- --- - -grounds alone. The petition presents only constitutional 
questions. f Respondent tries to work in Fair Housing Act 
; .... ·.+-s lot-i~ 
points whenAit restates the questions presented)~• · ? • &; 
-13-
but obviously that does not suffice. The answer to the statutory 
interpretation question is not so clear that we ought to 
decide it when it was not fully considered in the court 
.. below and when it has not been ... adequately presented 
or briefed here. 
I would reverse on the constitutional questions and 
remand for consideration of respondents' other claims. 
D.M. 
footnotes 
1. There is not necessarily af corrective available through 
the usual political process. If the community is fH sufficiently 
segregated, there will xaaii~ be no «8RXkikHk real constituency 
pushing for the needed changes. Cf. ~an Antonio School 
Dj§trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28: concluding that there 
was no class there which could be called suspect, the Court 
alleged 
emphasized that the/class was not "relegated to such a position 
of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protec-
tion from the majoritirian political process." 
is not to 
This aaaxxRax/imply that all zoning decisions should be 
subject to strict scrutiny. It does suggest, however, that 
the extreme deference mandated by Euclid and Belle Terre v. 
Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, should be tempered in appropriate 
cases by a realization of the strong, but subtle, exclusionary 
potential of the zoning device. Perhaps there is some kind 
showing 
of prima facie «axe/that should propel a court into closer 
obtains 
scrutiny than/under Euclid. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 75-616 
Village of Arlington Heights 
ET AL., Petitioners, 
v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
to the United States 
Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit .. 
[December -, 1976] 
MR. JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court .. 
In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village oi 
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel 
from single-iamily to multiple-family classification. Using 
federal nnancial assistance, MHbC planned to build 190 
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income 
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, 
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here, 
brought suit in the United States bistrict Court for the-
Northern District of Illinois.1 They alleged that the denif.l,l 
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial, 
the District Court entered judgment for the Village, 373 F. 
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed , finding that the-
"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory, 
1 Respondents named as defendants both the VtllagC' and IL number of 
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were the Mayor, the 
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zoning, and the entire· 
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will orca:sionally refer· 
\o all the I?etifipners collectively as "the Village." 
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. 517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted 
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) , 
and now reverse. 
I 
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about 
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the 
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family 
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. The 
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but, 
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its popu-
lation of racial minority groups remained quite low. Ac-
cording to the 1970 census, 27 of the Village's 64,000 residents 
were black. 
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (the Order), 
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington 
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high 
school, and part by the Order's three-story novitiate building, 
which houses dormitories and a Montessori school. Much 
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the 
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surround-
ing the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a single-
family specifica.tion with relatively small minimum lot size 
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there 
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the 
Viatorian property directly adjoins the' back yards of other 
single-family homes. 
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to 
low and moderate income housing. Investigation revealed 
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to 
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use 
of federal housing subsidies under § 236 of the National 
Housing Act. 12 U. S. C. § 1715z- 1.2 
2 Section 236 provides for "interest reduction payments" to owners of 
rental housing projects which met the Act's requirements, if the savings: 
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MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968 
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of 
building low and moderate income housing throughout the 
Chicago area. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building 
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already 
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller 
scale in other parts of the Chicago area. 
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into 
a 99-year lease and a.n accompanying agreement of sale cov-
ering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian 
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the 
sales agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing 
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assist-
ance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuc-
cessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract 
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain 
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal 
limitations governing land a.cquisition costs for § 236 housing. 
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula. 
Qualifying owners effectively pay one percent interest on money borrowed 
to construct, rehabilitate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has 
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began. 
See 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.) 
New commitments under § 236 were suspended in 197:3 by executive 
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could 
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid 
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under the 
§ 8 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development con-
tracts to pay the owner of the housing units a sum which will make up 
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount 
contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible tenant family pays 
between 15 and 25% of its gros~:; income for rent . Respondents indicated 
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construc-
tion of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning clearance 
is now granted. 
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MHI)C engaged an architect and proceeded with the proj~ 
ect, to be known as Lincoln Green. ·The plans called for 
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit 
having its own private entrance from the outside. One 
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought 
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have 
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site 
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes 
abutting the property to the east. 
The planned development did not conform to the Village's 
zoning ordinance and could not be built unless Arlington 
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing 
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village 
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by 
supporting materials describing the development and specify-
ing that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials 
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirma-
tive marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized de-
velopment is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted 
studies demonstra.ting the need for housing of this type and 
analyzing the probable impact of the development. To pre-
pare for the hearings before the Plan Commission and to 
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regu-
lations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the . 
Village staff for preliminary review of the development. 
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended 
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans. 
During the Spring of 1971, the Plan Commission consid-
ered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which 
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were 
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green, 
a number of individuals and representatives of c0mmunity 
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments, 
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was 
referred to as the "social issue"-the desirability or undesira ... 
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bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights 
low and moderate income housing, housing that would prob-
ably be racially integrated. 
Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning 
aspects of the petition, stressing two arguments. First. the 
area always had been zoned single-family, and the neigh-
boring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on 
that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a meas-
urable drop in property value for neighboring sites. Second, 
the Village's apartment policy, adopted by the Village Board 
in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R- 5 zoning primarily 
to serve as a buffer between single-family development and 
land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial or 
manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this 
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing 
district. 
At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission 
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of 
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated : 
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may 
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Com-
mission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed 
location." Two members votsd against the motion and sub-
mitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the 
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good 
zoning." The Village Board met on September 28, 1971, 
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the 
Plan Commission.. After a public hearing, the Board denied 
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. 
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals 
filed this lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief.8 A second nonprofit corporation and an 
8 The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class 
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 but the District Court declined 
to certify. 373 F . Supp., at 209. 
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individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain .. 
tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. As-
suming that MHDC !!!!Q _ _s.ta:~Hhf$. to bring the suit/ the 
Dist\ict Court' held that the petitioners were not motivated 
by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against low-
income groups when they denied rezpning, but rather by a 
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the 
Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp., at 211. The District 
Court concluded also that the denial would not have a racially 
discriminatory effect. 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved 
the District Court's finding that the defendants were moti-
vated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan, 
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether their 
refusal to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more 
complex. The court observed that the refusal would have 
a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based upon family in~ 
come, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area residents 
who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, al-
though they comprised a far lower percentage of total area 
population. The court reasoned, however, that under our 
decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), such 
a disparity in racial impact alone does not call for strict 
scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the con-
struction of the low-cost housing.5 
There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly 
~..l~---4• ~:F'I,r- P@MI!B~ -tit !Is~ IH? nat i! lca r f rgre Ute Pflr:.aM fi different district 
judge had heard early motions in the case. He had sustained the com-
plaint against a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the judge 
who finally decided the case said he found "no n to re-examine [the 
predecessor judge's] conclusions" ic' · · '. 373 F. Supp .• 
at 209. 
6 Nor is there reason to subject thEe> Village's action to more stringent 
review simply because it involvl'S respondents' interest in securing housing. 
l-indsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972). See generally San Antonio. 
[nr.('ependent School District v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-39 (1973) . 
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discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy 
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 
108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970), 
the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be 
examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate 
effect." 6 Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth 
in employment opportunities and population, but it continued 
to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. The court 
held that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this 
problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had been "ex-
plating" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly 
all-white community. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Village had 
no other current plans for building low and moderate income 
housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were avail-
able to MHDC at an economically feasible price. 
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially dis-
criminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served 
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire 
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The 
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' stand-
ing to bring the suit. It is not clear that this challenge was 
pressed in the Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction 
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plurality opinion), we shall consider it. 
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), a case similar in 
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional 
limita.tions and prudential considerations that guide a court 
6 This language apparently derived from our decision in Reitman v. 
Mttlkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of the 
'California Supreme Court in the case then under review) . 
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in determining a pa.rty's standing, and we need not repeat 
that discussion here. The essence of the standihg question, 
in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has 
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdic-
tion and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers 
on his behalf." !d., at 498-499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he him-
self is injured by the challenged action of the defendant. 
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP, 
412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint must indicate 
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's 
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
U.S. 614, 617 (1973). 
A 
Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the 
constitutional standing requirements. The challenged action 
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing 
the housing MHDC had contra.cted to place on the Viatorian 
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that 
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course, 
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would 
still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies,7 
and carry through with construction. But all housing de-
velopments are subject to some extent to similar uncertain-
7 Petitioners suggest that the suspen~ion of the § 236 housing assi~tance 
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed project 
and' therefore deprives MHDC of standing. The District Court also ex-
pressed doubts about MHDC's position in the case in light of the sus-
pension. 373 F. Supp., at 211. WhPthrr termination of all available 
assistance programs would preclude standing is not a matter we need 
to decide, in view of the current likelihood that ;;ub;:;idies may be secured 
under § 8 of the Hol1sing and Community DPvelopmrnt Act of 1974 .. 
See n. 2, suprq,. 
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ties. When a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln 
Green, a court is not required to engage in undue speculation 
as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite 
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an 
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U. S., at 38. 
Petitioners nonethless appear to argue that MHDC lacks 
standing because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC1 
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question. 
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning.8 
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied. 
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place1 
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury 
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions 
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars 
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted 
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Un-
less rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will 
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally 
attractive price. 
Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing re-· 
s Petitioners contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim 
here because a contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon 
rezoning cannot conte:;t a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Under-
the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standing to 
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston, 
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of 
Evanston, 29 Ill. App. 3d 782,331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975). 
State law, however, does not govern the standing determination in 
the federal courts. The constitutional and prudential conl:liderations 
canvassed at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), respond 
to concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to 
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unlesl:l they have an interest 
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necessarily disqualify 
MHDC from seeking relief in fedf'ral courtH for an asHerted injury to its; 
{(ld~r:al ri~hts. 
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quirements. It has long been clear that economic injury 
is not the only kind of injury that can support a plain-
tiff's standing. Ufl,ited States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. , at 686--
687; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972); 
Data Procesing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970) . 
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building 
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain, 
but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost hous-
ing available in areas where such housing is scarce. This is 
not mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest. 
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific 
project MHDC intends to buld, whether or not it will gen-
erate profits, provides that "essential dimension of specificity'' 
that informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 
(1974). 
B 
Clearly MlfDC has met the constitutional requirements 
and it therefore has standing to assert its own rights. Fore-
most among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary 
or irrational zoning actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 
183 (1928); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 
(1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the 
claim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid 
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead it has been 
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates 
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity 
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged 
discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied stand-
ing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S. , at 499. But we need not decide whether the 
circumstances of this case would justify departure from that 
prudential limitation and permit MHDC to assert the con-
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stitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. See 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf. Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237 (1969); 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72- 73 (1917). For we 
have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated 
standing to assert these rights as his own.0 
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell 
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20 
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother 
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks and would 
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington 
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green 
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer 
to his job. 
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing 
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action 
tha.t is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief 
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U. S. , at 504, ' that the Lincoln Green project 
will materialize , affording Ransom the housing opportunity 
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized griev-
ance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508 
n, 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent 
on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not 
before the court. See id. , at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 41-42. Unlike the individ-
ual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequately averred an 
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights1 
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits. 
III 
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426· U. S. 
9 Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider 
·whether the other individu.al and corporate pla.in tiffs have standing tG> 
·maintain the suit, 
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229 (1976), made it clear that official action will not be held 
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis ... 
proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not ir-
relevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious 
racial discrimination.,' !d., at 242. Proof of racially discrim ... 
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indi-
cations may be drawn from some of our cases/0 the holding 
in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety 
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U. S. 
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. 'l'exas, 325 
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection). 
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the chal-
lenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory pur-
poses. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or adminis-
trative body operating under a 'broad mandate made a 
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that 
a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.11 
In fact, it is because legisla.tors and administrators are prop-
erly concerned with balancing numerous competing considera-
tions that courts refrain 'from reviewing the merits of their 
decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. 
But racial discrimination deserves no weight in the legislative 
scales. When there · ~s ~roof, tl1~t a· discriminatory purpose 
10 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, ~25 (1971); Wright v. Council 
of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 461-462 (1972); cf. United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 381-386 (1968). See discussion in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976) . 
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 276-277 (1973), in a some-
what different context, we observed : 
"The search for legislative purpose is often f'lusive enough, Palme1· v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), without a rf'quirement that primacy be 
ascertained. Legislation is frequently multip~rposed: the removal of' 
even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legis-
lative judgment supporting the statute'.'' 
t , , 
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has been · in the decision, this !judicial 
deference is no longer justified.12 , ~ 
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was 
---:a;e- H8et,....i&l fa~ demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
1 
able. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears 
• more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis, 
\..,;.. a.__l\al.,.llt..,j f 426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point. 
'-J Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds ather' 
___.J than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even 
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 
(1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The 
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.13 But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or 
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,14 and the Court 
must look to other evidence.u 
_ ... 
1 ' or a scholarly discussion of legislative motivation, see Brest, Palmer 
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118. 
13 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category. Because 
of the nature -of the jury selection task, however, we have permitted a 
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does 
not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., T·urner· 
v, Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404,. 
407 (1967) . 
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official discrimination 
is a necessary predicate to a violation of the equal protection clause. A 
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act-in the exercise of the 
zoning power as elsewher~would not be immunized by the absence of 
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. See 
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975). 
16 In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of dis-
proportionate impact is merely to acknowledge t~e "heterogeneity" of the· 
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972) ;. 
~~ als9 Washi,nqton v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 248. 
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The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary 
BOlfrce, P~trticularly if it reveals a series of official actions 
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra; 
Griffin v. Cpunty School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis 
v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Alfl..), aff'd per curiam, 
33f? U. S. 933 (1949); cf. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
41;l U. S., at 207. The specific sequence of events leading 
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on 
tqe decisionmaker'& purposes. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 
36Q, 373-376 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 
233, 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here 
always had been zo:qed R-5 but suddenly was changed to 
R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect in-
tegrated housing,16 we would have a far different case. De-
partures from the normal procedural sequence also might 
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. 
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if 
the factors usually considered important by the decision-
maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.11 
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F . 2d 222 
(CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for a park 
upon learning that the homes plaintiffs were Precting there would be sold 
under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park 
Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2 
·1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 ( 1971) (town declared moratorium 
on new subdivisions and rezoned area for park land shortly after learning 
of plaintiffs' plans to build low in com!' housing). To the extent that 
the decision in Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of dis-
criminatory impact, we ha.ve indicated our disagreement. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244-245 . 
17 See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CA10 1970) . The 
plaintiffs in Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of 
a former :;chool that they had purcha;:;ed. The city refused to rezone 
the land from PF, its public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density 
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the 
present and the former planning director for the city testified that there 
was no reason "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be 
{:lassified R-4. Based on this and other evidence, the Court of Appeal~ 
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The legislative or administrative history may be highly rele-
vant, especially where there are contemporary statements by 
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, 
or reports. In some instances the members might be called 
to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the 
official action, although such testimony frequently will be 
barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 
(1951); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 (1974); 
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) .. 18 
The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to 
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining 
whether racially discriminatory intent existed ., With these 
in mind, we now address the case before us. 
IV 
This caSe was tried in the District Court and reviewed in 
the Court of Appeals before our decision in Washington v. 
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous 
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially 
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional. 
But both courts below understood that at least part of their 
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision. 
In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted 
that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at 
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposi-
tion to minority groups. The court held, however, that the 
ruled that "the record su:;tains the [District Court's] holding of racial 
motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action." !d., at 1040. 
18 This Court has recognized, ever since Fletche1· v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive mo-
tivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other 
branches of government. The problems involved have prompted a good 
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 356-361 (1949); A. Bickel, 
The Least Dangerow:; Branch, 208-221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and 
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205 
'(1970); Brest, supra, n. 8. 
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evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated 
the defendants." 373 F. Supp., at · 211. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on re-
spondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not 
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a 
strictness here 'that could only demonstrate some other unaer-
lying motive. The court concluded 'that the · buffer policy, 
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on 
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision 
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not 
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this 
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. '2d, at 412. The 
Court of Appe~ls therefore approved the District Court's 
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning 
to MHDC. 
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the 
Village's ·decision does arguably bear more hea.vily on racial 
minorities. Minorities comprise 18"% of the Chicago area 
population, and 40% of the income groups said to be eligible 
for Lincoln Green. Although this disparity is not excessive, 
when viewed against the background of substantial de fqcto 
housing segregation in Arlington Heights, it does tend to 
support further inquiry. But the evidence tending to negate 
the presence of discriminatory purpose substantially out-
weighs the ambiguous force of the disparity. There is little 
about the sequence of events leading up to the decision that 
would spark suspicion. The area around the Viatorian prop-
erty has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington 
Heights first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes 
surround the 80-acre site, and · the Village is undeniably com-
mitted to single-family homes as its dominant residential land 
use. The rezoning request progressed according to the usual 
procedures?0 The Plan Commission even scheduled two ad-
1 9 Respon4ents have made much of one apparent procedural departure. 
The ·parties stipulated that th.e Village Planner, the staff member who~:~~ 
,' 
, . ' 
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC 
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers 
to questions generated at the first hearing. 
· The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board 
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost 
exclusively on the zoning aspects .. of the MHDC petition, 
and the zoning factors on which they relied are not novel 
cri_teria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no· rea-
son to doubt that there has been reliance by some neighbor-
ing property owners on the maintenance of single-f11-mily 
zo~ing in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its · 
buffer policy long before 1\fflDC entered the picture and has 
applied the policy too consistently for us to infer discrimina-
tory purpose from its application in this case. Finally, 
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand · 
at trial. Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of 
inviqious purpose.20 
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the 
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents sim-
ply failed to carry their burden of proving that discrimina-
tory purpose was,.. fir ~88ti8B~ittl fae~·Qr in the Village's decision. 
primar)'r responsibility covered zoning and planning matters, was never 
ask~·for his written or oral opinion of the rezoning requPst . The 
trrlission does seem curious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what 
role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions, or whPthcr his 
opinion would be relevant to respondents' claims. 
zo Respondents compla.in that the District Court unduly limited their 
efforts t.o prove that the Village Board acted for discriminatory purposes, 
since it forbade questioning Board members about their motivation at 
the time they cast their votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in 
the circumstances of this case, even if such an inquiry into motivation 
woulq otherwise have been proper. See n. 18, supra. Respondents were 
allowect, both during the discovery phase and at trial, to question Board 
members fully about materials and information available to them at the 
time of decision. In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it 
-was effect and not motiv11tion which would make out · 11 constitutional 
·viola.t~on, the District Court's action was not improper. 
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This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court 
of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried 
a discriminatory "ultimate effect" is without independent 
legal significance. The judgment is reversed. 
v 
Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to 
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et 
seq. They have urged that claim here. The Court of Ap-
peals, however, proceediflg in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, 
did not de.cide the statutory question. We remand the case 
for further consideration limited to that issue. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court .. 
In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village or 
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel 
from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using 
federal financial assistance, MHbC planned to build 190 
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income 
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, 
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here, 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.1 They alleged that the deni~1 
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial, 
the District Court entered Judgment for the Village, 373 F. 
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the-
"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory, 
1 Respondents named as defendants both the Village and a number of 
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were the Mayor, the 
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zonmg, and the entire· 
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will occaswnally refer-· 
*P. all the I?etit'ipners collectively as "thr Village '' 
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. 517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted 
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) , 
and now reverse. 
I 
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about 
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the 
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family 
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. · The 
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but, 
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its popu-
lation of racial minority groups remained quite low. Ac-
cording to the 1970 census,,_27 of the Village's 64,000 residents 
were black. 
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (the Order), 
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington 
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high 
school, and part by the Order's three-story novitiate building, 
which houses dormitories and a Montessori school. Much 
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the 
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surround-
ing the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a single-
family specification with relatively small minimum lot size 
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there 
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the 
Viatorian property directly adjoins the· back yards of other 
single-family homes. 
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to 
low and moderate income housing. Investigation revealed 
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to · 
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use 
of federal housing subsidies under ~ 236 of the National 
Housing Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1.2 
2 Section 236 provides for "interest reduction payments" to owners of 
rental housing projects which met the Act's rectuirements, if the savings: 
~'r ? 
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MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968 
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of 
building low and moderate income housing throughout the 
Chicago a.rea. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building 
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already 
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller 
scale in other parts of the Chicago area. 
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into 
a 99-year lease and an accompanying agreement of sale cov-
ering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian 
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the 
sales agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing 
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assist-
ance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuc-
cessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract 
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain 
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal 
limitations governing land acquisition costs for § 236 housing. 
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula . 
Qualifying owners effectively pay onf' percent interest on money borrowed 
to construct, rehabilitate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has 
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began. 
See 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.) 
New commitments under § 236 were ~;uspended in 1973 by executive 
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could 
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid 
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat . 1068. Under the 
§ 8 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development con-
tracts to pay the owner of the housing units a sum which will make up 
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount 
contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible tenant family pays 
between 15 and 25% of its gross income for rent. Respondents indicated 
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construc-
tion of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning cle,arance 
is now granted. 
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MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the proj~ 
ect, to be known as Lincoln Green. ·The plans called for 
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit 
having its own private entrance from the outside. One 
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought 
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have 
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site 
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes 
abutting the property to the east. 
The planned development did not conform to the Village's 
zoning ordinance and could not be built unless Arlington 
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing 
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village 
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by 
supporting materials describing the development and specify-
ing that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials 
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirma-
tive marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized de-
velopment is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted 
studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and 
analyzing the probable impact o.f the development. To pre-
pare for the hearings before the Plan Commission and to 
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regu-
lations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the 
Village staff for prelimina.ry review of the development. 
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended 
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans. 
During the Spring of 1971, the Plan Commission consid-
ered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which 
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were 
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green, 
a number of individuals and representatives of cG>mmunity 
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments, 
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was 
referred to as the "social issue"- the desirability or undesira-. 
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bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights 
low and moderate income housing, housing that would prob-
ably be racially integrated. 
Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning 
aspects of the petition, stressing two arguments. First. the 
area always had been zoned single-family, and the neigh-
boring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on 
that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a meas-
urable drop in property value for neighboring sites. Second, 
the Village's apartment policy, adopted by the Village Board 
in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R-5 zoning primarily 
to serve as a buffer between single-family development and 
land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial or 
manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this 
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing 
district. 
At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission 
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of 
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated : 
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may 
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Com-
mission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed 
location." Two members votsd against the motion and sub-
mitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the 
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good 
zoning." The Village Board met on September 28, 1971, 
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the 
Plan Commission.. After a public hearing, the Board denied 
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. 
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals 
filed this lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief.3 A second nonprofit corporation and an 
a The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class 
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 but the District Court declined 
to certify. 373 F. Supp., at 209. 
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individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain~ 
tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. As-
suming that MHDC had standing to bring the suit,• the 
District Court held that the petitioners were not motivated 
by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against low~ 
income groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a 
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the 
Village's zoning plan." 373 F . Supp., at 211 . The District 
Court concluded also that the denial would not have a racially 
discriminatory effect. 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved 
the District Court's finding that the defendants were moti-
vated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan, 
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether their 
refusal to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more 
complex. The court observed that the refusal would have 
a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based upon family in-
come, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area residents 
who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, al-
though they comprised a far lower percentage of total area 
population. The court reasoned, however, that under our 
decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971) , such 
a disparity in racial impact alone does not call for strict 
scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the con-
struction of the low-cost housing.5 
There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly 
4 Fsr J@? Siil s ll'lJii.£f""o8MF'Mft- eleM..ft~ I'~, a different district 
judge had heard early motions in the cru;e. He had sustained the com-
plaint against a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the judge 
who finally decided the case said he found "no need to re-examine [the 
predecessor judge's] conclusions" concerning justiciability. 373 F. Supp., 
at 209. 
5 Nor is there reason to subjecL the Village's achon to more ;;1: ringent 
review simply because it involves respondrnts' interest in securing housing. 
l-indsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 73-74 (1972) . See generally San Antonia, 
[n<fependent School .District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 18-39 (1973 ) . 
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discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy 
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 
108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970), 
the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be 
examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate 
effect." 6 Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth 
in employment opportunities and population, but it continued 
to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. The court 
held that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this 
problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had bee11 "ex-
plq~ing" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly 
all-white community. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Village had 
no other current plans for building low and moderate income 
housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were avail-
able to MHDC at an economically feasible price. 
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially dis-
criminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served 
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire 
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The 
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' stand-
ing to bring the suit. It is not clear tha.t this challenge was 
pressed in the Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction 
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plurality opinion), we shall consider it. 
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) , a case similar in 
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutiona.l 
limitations and prudential considerations tha.t guide a court 
6 This language apparently derived from our decision in Reitman v. 
Mttlkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of the 
I California Supreme Court in the Cl!Se then under review) . 
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in determining a pa.rty's standing, and we need not repeat 
that discussion here. The essence of the standing question, 
in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has 
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdic-
tion and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers 
on his behalf." !d., at 498-499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he him-
self is injured by the challenged action of the defendant. 
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP, 
412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint must indicate 
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's 
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
.Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
u.s. 614, 617 (1973). 
A 
Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the 
constitutional standing requirements. The challenged actiou 
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing 
the housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian 
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that 
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course, 
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would 
still have to secure fi,nancing, qualify for federal subsidies/ 
and carry through with construction. But all housing de-
velopments are subject to some extent to similar uncertain~ 
7 Petitioners suggt'St that the suspension of the § 236 housing assistance 
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed project 
and therefore deprives MHDC of standing. The District Court also ex-
pressed doubts about MHDC's position in the case in light of the sus-
pension. 373 F. Supp., at 211. Whether termination of all available 
assistance programs would preclude standing is not a matter we need 
to decide, in view of the current likelihood that subsidies may be roecured 
under § 8 of the Hot\Sing and Community Development Act of 1974, 
See n. 2, supra;. 
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ties. When. a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln 
Green, a court is not required to engage in undue speculation 
as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite 
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an 
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U. S., at 38. 
Petitioners nonethless appear to argue that MHDC lacks 
standing because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC, 
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question. 
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning.8 
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied. 
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place1 
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury 
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions 
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars 
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted 
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Un-
less rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will 
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally 
attractive price. 
Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing re-
8 Petitioners contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim 
here because a contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon 
rezoning cannot contest. a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Under 
the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standmg to 
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston, 
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of 
'Evans~9 Ill. App. 3d 782,331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975) . r State law"A ~~-~ does not govern •lui iltaot+8tR~ determinatiot:[ln 
l!_he federal courts. The constitutional and prudential consideratwns 
canvassed at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975) , respond' 
to concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to 
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unless they have an interest 
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necessarily disqualify 
MHDC from seeking relief in fedPral courts for an asserted injury to its; 
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quirements. It has long been clear that economic injury' 
is not the only kind of injury that can support a plain-
tiff's st~nding. U11ited States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 686-
687; Sierr(l Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972) ; 
Data Procesirtg Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970) . 
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building 
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain, 
but rf\,ther from an interest in making suitable low-cost hous-
ing avail&ble in areas where such housing is scarce. This is 
not mere abstrl'\-Ct concern about a problem of general interest. 
See Sierra Cl'!.Lb v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific 
project MHDC intends to btid, whether or not it will gen-
erate profits, provides that "essential dimension of specificity'' 
that informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Re-. 
servists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 
(1974). 
B 
Clearly MlJDC has met the constitutional requirements 
and it therefore has standing to assert its own rights. Fore-
most among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary 
or irrational zoning actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U. S. 365 ( 1926) ; N ectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 
1S3 (1928); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 
(1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the 
cl~tim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid 
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead it has been 
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates 
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity 
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged 
discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied stand-
ing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 499. But we need not decide whether the 
circumstances of this case would justify departure from that 
prudential limitation anei permit MHDC to assert the con ... 
• • 
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stitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. See 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf. Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237 (1969); 
Buchanan v . . Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72-73 (1917). For we 
have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated 
standing to assert these rights as his own.9 
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell 
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20 
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother 
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks 1:\nd would 
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington 
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green 
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer 
to his job. 
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing 
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action 
tha.t is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief 
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U. 8., at 504, that the Lincoln Green project 
will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity 
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized griev-
ance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508 
n, 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent 
on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not 
before the court. See id., at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Riyhts Org., 426 U. 8., at 41-42. Unlike the individ-
ual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequa.tely averred an 
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights .. 
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. 8., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits. 
III 
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 
9 Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we nef'd not consider 
·whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing tCilJ 
maintain the suit, 
.. 
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229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will not be helQ 
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis ... 
proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not ir-
relevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious 
racial discrimination.)) !d., at 242. Proof of racially discrim ... 
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indi-
cations may be drawn from some of our cases/0 the holding 
in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety 
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S. 
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. Texas, 325 
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection). 
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the chal-
lenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory pur-
poses. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or adminis-
trative body operating under a 'broad mandate made a 
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that 
a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.11 
In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are prop-
erly concerned with balancing numerous competing considera-
tions that courts refrain "from reviewing the merits of their 
decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. 
But racial discrimination~eight--in the l€gislati¥e 
scales. When there ·is proof that ~scriminatory purpose 
10 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971) ; Wright v . Council 
of the Citv of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451 , 461--462 (1972); cf. Unite1l 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381-386 (1968). See di~cussion iu 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976). 
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S 263, 276-277 (1973) , in a some-
what different context, we observed : 
"The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971) , without a requirement that primacy be 
ascertained . Legislation is frequently multipurposed: the removal of 
even a 'subordinate' purpose may . hift altogether the consensus of legis-. 
lative judgment supporting the statute'.'' 
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has been a sttfists~~actor in the decision, this judicial 
deference is no longer justified.12 
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was 
a SYBB~aHiiJt1actor demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears 
more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point. 
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other 
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even 
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U. S. 347 (19l5); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 
(1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The 
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.13 But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or 
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative,14 and the Court 
must look to other evidence.15 
"' 12 F'O~"-a sgholarl¥-cliscussion of legi!!lat>ive- motiva.t.iruJ see Brest, Palmer 
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118. A 
13 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category. Because 
of the nature of the jury selection task, however , we have permitted a 
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does 
not approach the extremes of Yiclc Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., Turner· 
v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404,. 
407 (1967) . 
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official ijiscrimination 
is a necessary predicate to a violation of the equal protectiOn clause. A 
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act-in the exercise of the 
zoning power as elsewhere-would not..(be immumzea by tlie aflsence of" 
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. See 
City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975) . 
u In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of dis-
proportionate impact is merely tp acknowledge tpe "heterogeneity" of the· 
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972) ;. 
~~ als.c:> Washinqton v. Davis, 426 U. S., a,t 248. 
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The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary 
BOlfrce, p~rticularly if it reveals a series of official actions 
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra,· 
Griffin v. Cpunty School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis 
v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Alft.), aff'd per curiam, 
33~ U.S. ~33 (1949); cf. Keyes v. Sclwol District No.1, 
41~ U. S., at 207. The specific sequence of events leading 
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on 
tqe decisionma~er'~ purposes. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 
36Q, 373-~7~ (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 
233, 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here 
always had been zoqed R-5 but suddenly was changed to 
R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect in-
tegrated housing,16 we would have a far different case. De-
partures from the normal procedural sequence also might 
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. 
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if 
the factors usually considered important by the decision-
maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.n 
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222 
(CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for a park 
upon learning that the homes pla.intiffs were erecting there would be sold 
under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park 
Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2 
· 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium 
on new subdivisions and rezoned area for park land shortly after Jearnh1g 
of plaintiffs' plans to build low iflcome housing). To the extent that 
the decision ill Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of dis-
criminatory impact, we have indicated our disagreement. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244--245. 
17 See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CAlO 1970) . The 
plaintiffs m Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of 
a former <iChool that they had purcha;;ed. The city refused to rezone 
the land from PF, its public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density 
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the 
present and the former planning director for the city testified that there 
was no reason "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be 
(:lassified R-4. Based on thi> and other evidenet'>, the Court of Appealfi. 
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The legislative or administrative history may be highly rele-
vant, especially where there are contemporary statements by 
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings 
or reports. In somej1ns ances the members might be called 
to the stand at tria(to testify concerning the purpose of the 
official action, although ,fs""uCTltestimony frequently will be 
barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 
(1951); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 (1974); 
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)..18 
The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to 
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining 
whether racially discriminatory intent existed., With these 
in mind, we now address the case before us. 
IV 
This case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in 
the Court of Appeals before our decision in Washin(Jton v. 
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous 
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially 
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional. 
But both courts below understood that at least part of their 
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision. 
In making its findings on 'this issue, the District Court noted 
that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at 
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposi-
tion to minority groups. The court held, however, that the 
ruled that "the record sustains the [District Court's] holding of racial 
motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action." !d., at 1040. 
18 This Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive mo-
tivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other 
branches of governmen~"rne problems invOlved have prompted a good 
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 356-361 (1949); A. Bickel, 
The Least Da11gerous Branch, 208--221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and 
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J . 1205 
'(1970) ; Brest, supra, n. 8. 
d ---
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evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated 
the defendants." 373 F. Supp., at 211. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on re-
spondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not 
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a 
strictness here 'that could only demonstrate some other under-
lying motive. The court concluded that the · buffer policy, 
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on 
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision 
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not 
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this 
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. 2d, at 412. The 
Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's 
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning 
to MHDC. 
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the 
Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial 
minorities. Minorities comprise 18?'o of the Chicago area 
population, and 40% of the income groups said to be eligible 
for Lincoln Green. lJlthough this disparity is not excessive, 
when viewed against the background of substantial de facto 1 
housing segregation in Arlington Heights, it does tend to 
support further inquiry. But the evidence tending to nega,.te 
the presence of discriminatory purpose substantially out-
weighs the ambiguous force of the dispari~'J ere IS Ittle 
about the sequence of events leading up to the decision that r' 
would spark suspicion. The area around the Viatorian prop- ~ 
erty has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington 
Heights first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes 
surround the 80-acre site, 'and the Village is undeniably com-
mitted to single-family homes as its dominant residential land 
use. The rezoning Tequest progressed according to the usual 
procedures.1 0 The Plfl.n Commission even scheduled two ad-
u Respon4ents have made much of one apparent procedural departure. 
The ·parties stipulated that the Village Planner, the staff member whos~ 
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC 
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers 
to questions generated at the first hearing. 
The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board 
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost 
exclusively on the zoning aspects of the MHDC petition, 
and the zoning factors on which they 'relied are not novel 
criteria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no rea-
son to doubt that there has been reliance by some neighbor-
ing property owners on the maintenance of single-f11mily 
zoning in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its 
buffer policy long before l'vJHDC entered the picture and has 
applied the policy too consistently for us to infer discrimina-
tor}' purpose from its application in this case. Finally, 
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand 
at trial. Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of 
invidious purpose.20 
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the 
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents sim-
ply failed to caqy their burden of proving tha.t discrimina-
tory purpose was a substantial factor in the Village's decision. 
primary responsibility covered zoning and planning matters , was never 
asked for his written or oral opiJlion of the rezoning request. The 
omission does seem curious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what 
role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions, or wh!:'ther his 
opinion would be relevant to respondents' claims. 
zo Respondents complain tha.t the District Court unduly limited their 
efforts to prove that tl1e Village Board acted for discriminatory purposes, 
since it forbade questioning Board members about their motivation at 
the time they cast their votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in 
the circumstances of this case, even if such an inquiry into motivation 
would otherwise have been proper. Seen. 18, supra. Respondents were 
allowed, both during the discovery phase and at trial, to question Board 
members fully about materials and information av!iilable to them at the 
time of decision. In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it 
was effect and not motiv11tion which would make out a com;titutio.nal 
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This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court 
of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried 
a discriJUinatory "ultimate effect" is without independent 
legal significance. The judgment is reversed. 
v 
Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to 
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et 
seq. .::raey .luL.ve. nrged-#wt;t laim here, The Court of Ap-
pea1s, however, proceediqg in a somewhat unorthodox fashion , 
did not de.cide the statutory question. We remand the case 
for further consideration limited to that issue. 
Reversed anq remanded. 
,_ a 1 1- 1 :; 1) I' 17 I? 
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In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village of 
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel 
from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using 
federal financial assistance, MHDC planned to build 190 
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income 
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, 
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here, 
brought suit l.n the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.1 'They alleged that the denial 
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 
1968, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial, 
the District Court entered judgment for the Village, 373 F. 
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the 
"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory, 
1 Respondents named as defendants both the Village and a number of 
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were the Mayor, the 
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zoning, and the entire 
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will occasionally refer 
to all the petitioners collectively as "the Vtllagf' " 
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Four~ 
teenth Amendment. 517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted 
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975) , 
and now reverse. 
I 
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about 
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the 
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family 
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. The 
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but, 
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its popu-
lation of racial minority groups remained quite low. Ac-
cording to the 1970 census, only 27 of the Village's 64,000 
residents were black. 
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious order (the Order) , 
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington 
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high 
school, and part by the Order's three-story novitiate building, 
which houses dormitories and a Montessori school. Much 
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the 
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surround-
ing the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a single-
family specification with relatively small minimum lot size 
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there 
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the-
Viatorian property directly adjoins the back yards of other 
single-family homes. 
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to 
low and moderate income housing. Investigation revealed 
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to 
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use 
of federal housing subsidies under ~ 236 of the National' 
Housing Act, 12 U S. 0 . ~ 1715z-1.? 
2 Section 236 provides for "intere~t reduct iOn payments" to owners of 
rent~] h~usin~ J2fOJeCtR whi_ch lll.et the Act's requirements, if the $avjngs; 
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MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968 
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of 
building low and moderate income housing throughout the 
Chicago area. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building 
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already 
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller 
scale in other parts of the Chicago area. 
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into 
a 99-yea.r lease and an accompanying agreement of sale cov-
ering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian 
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the 
sales agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing 
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assist-
ance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuc-
cessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract 
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a ba.rgain 
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal 
limitations governing land acquisition costs for § 236 housing. 
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula. 
Qualifying owners effectively pay one percent interest on money borrowed 
to construct, rehabilitate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has 
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began. 
See 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.) 
New commitments under § 236 were suspended in 1973 by executive 
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could 
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid 
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under the 
§ 8 program, the Department of Housmg and Urban Development con-
tracts to pay the owner of the honsmg umts a sum which will make up 
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount 
contributed by the low-mcome tenant. The eligible tenant family pays 
between 15 and 25% of its gross mcorrw for rent. Respondents indicated 
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construc-
tion of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning clearance 
is now .~ranted. 
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MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the proj-
ect, to be known as Lincoln Green. The plans called for 
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit 
having its own private entrance from the outside. One 
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought 
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have 
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site 
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes 
abutting the property to the east. 
The planned development did not conform to the Village's 
zoning ordinance and could I!9t be built unless Arlington 
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing 
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village 
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by 
supporting materials describing the development and specify-
ing that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials 
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirma-
tive marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized de-
velopment is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted 
studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and 
analyzing the probable impact of the development. To pre-
pare for the bearings before the Plan Commission and to 
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regu-
lations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the 
Village staff for preliminary review of the development. 
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended 
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans. 
During the Spring of 1971, the Plan Commission consid-
ered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which 
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were 
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green, 
a number of individuals and representatives of community 
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments, 
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was 
:ref~rreg_ to as the "soQial i~ue"-the d.e&ir.v.bility or undesira-
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bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights 
low and moderate income housing, housing that would prob-
ably be racially integrated. 
Many of the opponents, however, focused on the zoning 
aspects of the petition, stressing two arguments. First, the 
area always had been zoned single-family, and the neigh-
boring citizens had built or purchased there in reliance on 
that classification. Rezoning threatened to cause a meas-
urable drop in property value for neighboring sites. Second) 
the Village's apa.rtment policy, adopted by the Villa.ge Board 
in 1962 and amended in 1970, called for R-5 zoning primarily 
to serve as a buffer between single-family development and 
land uses thought incompatible, such as commercial or 
manufacturing districts. Lincoln Green did not meet this 
requirement, as it adjoined no commercial or manufacturing 
district. 
At the close of' the third meeting, the Plan Commission 
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of 
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated : 
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may 
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Corn-
mission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed 
location." Two members voted against the motion and sub-
mitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the 
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good 
zomng. ' ' The Village Board met on September 28, 1971, 
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the 
Plan Commission.. After a public hearing, the Board denied 
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. 
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals 
filed this lawsmt against the Village, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive re1ief.8 A second nonprofit corporation and an 
8 The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class 
action pursuant to Fed. Rule Civ Proc. 23 but the District Court declined 
to cerit1fy 373 F . Supp ., at 209. 
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individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain~ 
tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. As-
suming that MHDC had standing to bring the suit/ the 
District Court held that the petitioners were not motivated 
by racial discrimination or intent to discriminate against low 
income groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a 
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the 
Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp., at 211. The District 
Court concluc:J"ed also that the denial would not have a racially 
discriminatory effect. 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved 
the District eourt's finding that the defendants were moti-
vated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan, 
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether their· 
refusal· to rezone would have discriminatory effects was more 
complex. The court observed that the refusal would have 
a disproportionate impact on blacks. Based upon family in-. 
come, blacks constituted 40% of those Chicago area residents 
who were eligible to become tenants of Lincoln Green, al-
though they comprised a far lower percentage of total area 
population. The court reasoned, however, that under our 
decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 (1971), such 
a disparity ih racial impact alone does not call for strict 
scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents the con-
struction of the low-cost housing.5 
There was another level' to the court's analysis of a.llegedly 
-t A different district judge had heard early motions in the case. H<> 
hnd sustained the complaint agamst a motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing, and the judge who finally dec1ded thr case ~aid he found "no, 
need to re-examine [the predeees.~or judge'H I concluswns" m this respect. 
373 F . Supp., at 209. 
6 Nor is there reason to subject the Village's a.ction to more stringent 
review simply because it involves respondents ' interest in securing housing. 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U. S. 56, 73-74 (1972) . See generally San Antonio, 
~nd_eJ!endent Srhool Dtstrict v. Rodripuez, 41l U S 1; 18-39 (1973), ._ 
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discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy 
Park Homes Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 
108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970), 
the Court of Appeals ruled that the denial of rezoning must be 
examined in light of its "historical context and ultimate 
effect." 6 Northwest Cook County was enjoying rapid growth 
in employment opportQnities and population, but it continued 
to exhibit a high degree of residential segregation. The court 
held that Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this 
problem. Indeed, it found that the Village had been "ex-
ploiting" the situation by allowing itself to become a nearly 
all-white community. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Vill11ge had 
no other current plans for building low and moderate income 
housing, and no other R-5 parcels in the Village were avail-
able to MHDC at an economically feasible price. 
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially dis-
criminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served 
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire 
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The 
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' stand-
ing to bring the suit. It is not clear that this challenge was 
pressed in tbe Court of Appeals, but since our jurisdiction 
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McK(3ithen, 395 
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plura1ity opinion), w~ shall consider it. 
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), a case similar in 
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional 
limitations and prudentiAl consideration~ that guide a coQrt 
6 This language apparently derived from our decision jn Reitman v. 
Mtdkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of thB 
California Supreme Court in the case then under .review). 
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in determining a pa.rty's standing, and we need not repeat 
that discussion here. The essence of the standing question, 
in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has 
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdic-
tion and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers 
on his behalf." Id., at 498--499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he him-
self is injured by the challenged action of the defendant. 
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP, 
412 U. S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint must indicate 
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's 
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41-42 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
u. s. 614, 617 (1973) . 
A 
Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the 
constitutional standing requirements. The challenged action 
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing 
the housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian 
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that 
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course, 
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would 
still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies/ 
and carry through with construction. But all housing de-
velopments are subject to some extent to similar uncertain-
7 Petitioner;; suggest that the suspension of the § 236 housing assistance 
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed project 
and therefore depnves MHDC of standing. The District Court also ex-
pressed doubts about MHDC's position m tlw case in light of the sus-. 
pension. 373 F. Supp., at 211. Whether termination of all available· 
assistance programs would ·preclude standing is not a matter we need 
to decide, in view of the current likelihood that subsidies may be secured 
under § 8 of the Housing: and. Communit ' Development Act of 1974, 
~~~ n. 2, suprtJ<. 
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ties. When. a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln 
Green, a court is not required to engage in undue speculation 
as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite 
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an 
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U. S., at 38. 
Petitioners nonethless appear to argue that MHDC lacks 
standing because it has suffered no economic injury .. MHDC, 
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question. 
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning.8 
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied. 
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place, 
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury 
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions 
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars 
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted 
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Un-
less rezoning is granted, many of these plans and studies will 
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at an equally 
attractive price. 
Petitioners' argument also misconceives our standing re-
8 Petitioners contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim 
here because a .contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon 
rezoning cannot contest a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Under 
the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standing to 
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston, 
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of 
Evanston, 29 Ill. App. 3d 782,331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975) . 
State law of standing, however, does not govern such determinations in } 
the federal courts. The constitutional and prudential considerations 
canvassed· at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (1975), respond 
to concerns that are peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to 
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unless they have an interest 
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necessarily disqualify 
MHDC from seeking relief in federal courts for an a.~serted injury to its 
federal rights. 
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quirements. It has long been clear that economic injury 
is not the only kind of injury that can support a plain-
tiff's standing. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S., at 686-
'687; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972); 
Data Procesing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970). 
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building 
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain, 
but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost hous-
ing available in areas where such housing is sca.rce. This is 
not mere abstract concern about a problem of general interest .. 
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific 
project MHDC intends to b.uild, whether or not it will gen-. 
erate profits, pvovides that "essential dimension of specificity" 
that informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Re-
servists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 
'(1974). 
B 
Clearly MHDC has met the constitutional requirements 
and it therefore has stanqing to a.ssert its own rights. Fore-
most among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary 
or irrational zoning actions. See 'Euclid v. Ambler Realty· 
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, '277 U. S. 
183 (1928); Villal)e of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 
(1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the 
claim that the Village's decision fails the generous 'Euclid 
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre . Instead it has been 
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates 
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC ha.s no racial identity 
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged 
discrimination . In the ordinary case, a party is denied stand-
·ing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 499. But we need not decide whether the 
circumstances of this case would justify departure from that 
prudential limitation and J?etmit MHDC to assert the CQn ... 
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stitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. See 
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf. Sullivan v. 
Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229, 237 (1969); 
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72-73 (1917). For we 
have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated 
standing to assert these rights as his own.0 
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell 
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20 
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother 
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks and would 
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington 
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green 
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer 
to his job. 
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing 
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action 
that is racially discriminatory. If a court grants the relief 
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 504, ' that the Lincoln Green project 
will materialize, affording Ransom the housing opportunity 
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a genera.lized griev-
ance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508 
n. 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent 
on speculation about the pos.Sible actions of third parties not 
before the court. See id., at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 41-42. Unlike the individ-
ual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequately averred an 
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights' 
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits. 
UI 
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 
9 Because of the presence of tins plaintiff, we need not consider 
whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to . 
maintain the suit. 
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229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will not be held 
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis-' 
proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not ir-
relevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious 
racial discrimination." I d., at 242. Proof of racially discrim-
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indi-
cations may be drawn from some of our cases,"{) the holding 
in Davis reaffirmed a. principle well established in a variety 
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No.1, 413 U.S. 
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. Texas, 325 
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection). 
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the chal-
lenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory pur-
poses. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or adminis-
trative body operating under a broad mandate made a 
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that 
a particular purpose was the "dominant" or "primary" one.11 
In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are prop-
erly concerned with bala.ncing numerous competing considera-
tions that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their 
decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. 
But racial discrimination is not just another competing con- \ 
sideration. When there is a proof that a discriminatory pur-
10 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971) ; Wrignt v. Council 
of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 461-462 (1972); cf. United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 381-386 (1968) . See discussion in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976) . 
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U. S. 263, 276- 277 (1973), in a some-
what different context, we observed : 
"The search for legislath·e purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U. S. 217 (1971) , without a requirement t hat primacy be 
ascertained. Legislat ion is frequently mult ipurposed : the removal of 
even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the consensus of. legia· 
lativ~ j\\dgment supporting the statute." 
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pose has been a motivating factor in the decision , this judicial \ 
deference is no longer justified.1 2 
Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was 
a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such \ 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears 
more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point. 
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other 
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even 
when the · governing legislation appears neutral on its face. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 
(1939); Gomillion 1 v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960). The 
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy.18 But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or 
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative/4 and the Court 
must look to other evidence.15 
12 For a scholarly discussion of legislative motivation, see Brest, Palmer 
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla-
tive Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118. 
18 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category. Because 
of the nature of the jury selection task, however, we have permitted a 
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does 
not approach the extremes of Yick Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., Turne1· 
v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970) ; Sims v. Geo1'gia, 389 U. S. 404, 
407 (1967) . 
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official racial discrimi-
nation is a necessary predicate to a violation of the equal protection 
clause. A single invidious!~· discriminatory governmental act~in the 
exercise of the zoning power as elsewhere--would not necessarily be 
immunized by the absence of such discrimination in the making of other 
comparable decisions. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 
358, 378 (1975) . 
15 In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of dis-
proportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the "heterogeneity" of the 
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972) ; 
.see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at 248. 
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The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary 
source, pa-rticularly if it reveals a series of official actions 
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra,· 
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis 
v. Schnf3ll, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 
336 U. S. 933 (1949); cf. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
413 U. S., ~tt 207. The specific sequence of events leading 
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on 
the decisionmaker's purposes. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 
369, 373-376 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 
233, 250 ( 1936). For example, if the property involved here 
always had been zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to 
R~3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect in-
tegrated housing/6 we would have a far different case. De-
partures from the normal procedural sequence ~tlso might 
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. 
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if 
the factors usually considered important by the decision-
maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.17 
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222 
(CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for a park 
upon learning that t.he homes plaintiffs were erecting there would be sold 
under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park 
Homes Association, Inc . v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium 
on new subdivisiqns and rezoned area for park land shortly after learning 
·of plaintiffs' plans to build low income housing). To the extent that 
the decision in Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of dis-
criminatory impact, we have indicated our disagreement. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244-24ti . 
17 See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CA10 1970). The 
plaintiffs in Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of 
a former school that they had purcha~ed . The city refused to rezone 
the land from PF, its public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density 
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the 
present and the former planning director for the city testified that there 
was no reason "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be 
<Cl~~ified R-4. Based on this and other evidence, the Court of Appeals 
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The legislative or administrative history may be highly rele-
vant, especially where there are contemporary statements by 
members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, 
or reports. In some extraordina,ry instances the members 
might be called to the stand at trial to testify concerning 
the purpose of the official action, although even then such 
testimony frequently will be barred by privilege. See Ten-
ney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 (1951); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 ( 1974); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).18 
The foregoing summary identifies, without purporting to 
be exhaustive, subjects of proper inquiry in determining 
whether racially discriminatory intent existed.. With these 
in mind, we now address the case before us. 
IV 
This case was tried in the District Court and reviewed in 
the Court of Appeals before our decision in Washington v. 
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous 
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially 
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional. 
But both courts below understood that at least part of their 
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision. 
In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted 
ruled that "the record sustains the [District Court's] holding of racial 
motivation and of arbitrary and unreasonable action." !d., at 1040. 
18 This Court, has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive mo-
tivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other 
branches of government. Placing a deci::;ionmaker on the stand is there.-~ 
fore "usually to be avoided.'' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
401 U. S. 402, 420 ( 1971). The problrms involved havr prompted a good 
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 , 356-361 (1949); A. Bickel, 
The Least Dangerous Branch, 208--221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and 
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205 
(·3.970) ; Brest, supra, n. 8. 
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that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at 
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposi-
tion to minority groups. The court helci, however, that the 
evidence i'does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated 
the defendants." 373 F. Supp., at 211. , 
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on re-
spondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not 
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a 
strictness here that could only demonstrate some other under-
lying motive. The court concluded that the buffer policy, 
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on 
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision 
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not 
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this 
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. 2d, at 412. The 
Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's 
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning 
to MHDC. 
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the 
Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial 
minorities. Minorities comprise 18% of the Chicago area 
population, and 40o/o of the income groups said to be eligible 
1 
_ IJ _-r-· 
for Lincoln Green. B~t there is little about the sequence / ~
of events leading up to the decision that would spark 
suspiCion. The area .around the Viatorian property has 
been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington Heights 
first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes surround 
the 80-~tcre site, and the Village is undeniably committed 
to single-family homes as its dominant residential land 
use. The rezoning request progressed according to the usual 
procedures.19 The Plan Commission even scheduled two ad-
19 Respondents have made much of one apparent procedural departure. 
The parties stipulated that the Vilhge Planner, the staff member whose 
primary responsibility· covered zoning smd planning matters, was never 
asked for his written or oral opinion of the rezoning request. The 
omi.ssion d.oes seem rurious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what 
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC 
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers 
to questions generated at the first hearing. 
The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board 
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost 
exclusively o·n the zoning aspects of the MHDC Petition, 
and the zoning factors on which they relied are not novel 
criteria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no rea-
son to doubt that there has been relian,ce by some neighbor-
ing property owners on the maintenance of single-family 
zoning in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its 
buffer policy long before MHDC entered the picture and has 
applied the policy too consistently for us 'to infer discrimina-
tory purpose from its application in this case. Finally, 
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand 
at trial. · 'Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of 
invidious purpose.20 
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the 
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents sim-
ply failed to carry their burden of proving that discrimina-
tory purpose was a motivating factor in the Village's decision.21 1 
' role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions, or whether his 
opinion would be relevant to respondent-s' claims. 
zo Respondents complain tbat tbe District Court unduly limited their 
efforts to prove that tbe Village Board acted for discriminatory purposes, 
since it forbade questioning Board menibers about their motivation at 
the time they cast tbeir votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in 
the circumst~tnces of this oase, even if such an inqui1y into motivation 
would otherwise h~tve been proper. Seen. 18, supra. Respondents were 
allowed, both during the discovery phase and at trial, to question Board 
members fully about materials and information available to them at the 
tim~ of decision. In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it 
was effect and not motiv~ttion which would make out a constitutional 
violation, the District Court's action was not improper. 
21 Proof that the decision by the Village was motivated in part by a I 
radally discriminatory purpose would not necessarily have required inval-
idartion of the ch.11llenged decision. Such proof would , howtwer, have 
.. 
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This conclusion ends the constitutional inquiry. The Court 
of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried 
a discriminatory "ultimate effect" is without independent 
constitutional significance. 
v 
Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to 
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 
et seq. They continue to urge here that a zoning decision 
made by a public body may', and that petitioners' action 
here did, violate § 3604 or § 3617. The Court of Appeals, 
however, proceeding in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, did 
not decide the statutory question. We remand the case for 
further consideration of respondents' statutory claims. 
Rever[Jed and remanded. 
MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
shifted to the Village the burden of establishing that the same decision 
would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose not been con-
sidered. If this were established, the complaining party in a case of this 
kind no longer fairly could attribute the injury complained of to improper 
consideration of a discriminatory purpose. In such circumstances, there 
would be no justification for judicial interference with the challenged! 
decision. But in this . case respondents failed to make the required 
tJ!reshold showing. See Mt . Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Education. 
y, /)oyle, No . . 75-1278, post, p. - .. 
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In 1971 respondent Metropolitan Housing Development 
Corporation (MHDC) applied to petitioner, the Village of 
Arlington Heights, Ill., for the rezoning of a 15-acre parcel 
from single-family to multiple-family classification. Using 
federal financial assistance, MHDC planned to build 190 
clustered townhouse units for low and moderate income 
tenants. The Village denied the rezoning request. MHDC, 
joined by other plaintiffs who are also respondents here, 
brought suit in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.1 They alleged that the denial 
was racially discriminatory and that it violated, inter alia, 
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Fair Housing Act of 
1968. 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et seq. Following a bench trial, 
the District Court entered judgment for the Village, 373 F. 
Supp. 208 (1974), and respondents appealed. The Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding tha.t the 
"ultimate effect" of the denial was racially discriminatory, 
1 Respondents named as defrndants both the Village and a number of 
its officials, sued in their official capacity. The latter were thr Mayor, the 
Village Manager, the Director of Building and Zoning, and the entire 
Village Board of Trustees. For convenience, we will occasionally refer 
to all the petitioners collectively as "the Village." 
,, 
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and that the refusal to rezone therefore violated the Four-
teenth Amendment. '517 F. 2d 409 (1975). We granted 
the Village's petition for certiorari, 423 U. S. 1030 (1975), 
and now reverse. 
I 
Arlington Heights is a suburb of Chicago, located about 
26 miles northwest of the downtown Loop area. Most of the 
land in Arlington Heights is zoned for detached single-family 
homes, and this is in fact the prevailing land use. The 
Village experienced substantial growth during the 1960's, but, 
like other communities in northwest Cook County, its popu-
lation of racial minority groups remained quite low. Only 
27 o.f the Village's 64,000 residents were black, according 
to the 1970 census. 
The Clerics of St. Viator, a religious ol'der (the Order), 
own an 80-acre parcel just east of the center of Arlington 
Heights. Part of the site is occupied by the Viatorian high 
school, and part by the Order's three-story nov1tiate building, 
which houses dormitories and a Montessori s·chool. Much 
of the site, however, remains vacant. Since 1959, when the 
Village first adopted a zoning ordinance, all the land surround-
ing the Viatorian property has been zoned R-3, a single-
family specification with relatively small minimum lot size 
requirements. On three sides of the Viatorian land there 
are single-family homes just across a street; to the east the 
Viatorian property directly adjoins the back yards of other 
single-family homes. 
The Order decided in 1970 to devote some of its land to 
low and moderate income housing Investigation revealed 
that the most expeditious way to build such housing was to 
work through a nonprofit developer experienced in the use 
of federal housing subsidies under § 236 of the National 
Housing Act, 12 U. S. C. § 1715z-1.2 
2 Section 236 provides for "interest reduction payments" to owners of 
rental housing projects which met the Act's requirements, if the savings 
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MHDC is such a developer. It was organized in 1968 
by several prominent Chicago citizens for the purpose of 
building low and moderate income housing throughout the 
Chicago area. In 1970 MHDC was in the process of building 
one § 236 development near Arlington Heights and already 
had provided some federally assisted housing on a smaller 
scale in other parts of the Chicago area. 
After some negotiation, MHDC and the Order entered into 
a 99-year lease and an accompanying agreement of sale cov-
ering a 15-acre site in the southeast corner of the Viatorian 
property. MHDC became the lessee immediately, but the 
sttles agreement was contingent upon MHDC's securing 
zoning clearances from the Village and § 236 housing assist-
ance from the Federal Government. If MHDC proved unsuc-
cessful in securing either, both the lease and the contract 
of sale would lapse. The agreement established a bargain 
purchase price of $300,000, low enough to comply with federal 
limitations governing land acquisition costs for § 236 housing. 
are passed on to the tenants in accordance with a rather complex formula. 
Qualifying owners effectively pay one percent interest on money borrowed 
to construct, rehabi litate or purchase their properties. (Section 236 has 
been amended frequently in minor respects since this litigation began. 
See 12 U.S. C.§ 1715z-1 (1970 ed., Supp. V), and the Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94--375, § 4, 90 Stat. 1070.) 
New commitments under § 236 were suspended in 1973 by executive 
decision, and they have not been revived. Projects which formerly could 
claim § 236 assistance, however, will now generally be eligible for aid 
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 
U. S. C. § 1437f (1970 ed., Supp. V), as amended by Housing Authori-
zation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-375, § 2, 90 Stat. 1068. Under the 
§ 8 program, the Department of Housing and Urban Development con-
tracts to pay the owner of the housing units a sum which will make up 
the difference between a fair market rent for the area and the amount 
contributed by the low-income tenant. The eligible tenant family pays 
between 15 and 25% of its gross income for rent. Respondents indicated 
at oral argument that, despite the demise of the § 236 program, construc-
tion of the MHDC project could proceed under § 8 if zoning clearance 
is now granted. 
.. 
75-616-0PINION 
4 ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP. 
MHDC engaged an architect and proceeded with the proj-
ect, to be known as Lincoln Green. The plans called for 
20 two-story buildings with a total of 190 units, each unit 
having its own private entrance from the outside. One 
hundred of the units would have a single bedroom, thought 
likely to attract elderly citizens. The remainder would have 
two, three or four bedrooms. A large portion of the site 
would remain open, with shrubs and trees to screen the homes 
abutting the property to the east. 
The planned development did not conform to the Village's 
zoning ordinance and could not be built unless Arlington 
Heights rezoned the parcel to R-5, its multiple-family housing 
classification. Accordingly, MHDC filed with the Village 
Plan Commission a petition for rezoning, accompanied by 
supporting materials describing the development and specify-
ing that it would be subsidized under § 236. The materials 
made clear that one requirement under § 236 is an affirma-
tive marketing plan designed to assure that a subsidized de-
velopment is racially integrated. MHDC also submitted 
studies demonstrating the need for housing of this type and 
analyzing the probable impact of the development. To pre-
pare for the hearings before the Plan Commission and to 
assure compliance with the Village building code, fire regu-
lations, and related requirements, MHDC consulted with the 
vmage staff for preliminary review of the development. 
The parties have stipulated that every change recommended 
during such consultations was incorporated into the plans. 
During the Spring of 1971, the Plan Commission consid-
ered the proposal at a series of three public meetings, which 
drew large crowds. Although many of those attending were 
quite vocal and demonstrative in opposition to Lincoln Green, 
a number of individuals and representatives of community 
groups spoke in support of rezoning. Some of the comments, 
both from opponents and supporters, addressed what was 
referred to as the "social issue"-the desirability or undesira-
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bility of introducing at this location in Arlington Heights 
low and moderate income housing, housing that would prob-
ably be racially integrated. 
Many of the opponents focused on the zoning aspects of 
the petition, stressing two arguments. First, the area. always 
had been zoned single family, and the neighboring citizens 
had built or purchased there in reliance on that classification. 
Rezoning threatened to cause a measurable drop in property 
value for neighboring sites. Second, the Village's apartment 
policy, adopted by the Village Board in 1962 and amended 
in 1970, called for R-5 zoning primarily to serve as a buffer 
between single family development and land uses thought 
incompatible, such as commercial or manufacturing districts. 
Lincoln Green did not meet this requirement, as it adjoined 
no commercial or manufacturing district. 
At the close of the third meeting, the Plan Commission 
adopted a motion to recommend to the Village's Board of 
Trustees that it deny the request. The motion stated: 
"While the need for low and moderate income housing may 
exist in Arlington Heights or its environs, the Plan Com-
mission would be derelict in recommending it at the proposed 
location. Two members voted against the motion and sub-
mitted a minority report, stressing that in their view the 
change to accommodate Lincoln Green represented "good 
zoning." The Village Board met on September 28, 1971, 
to consider MHDC's request and the recommendation of the 
Plan Commission., After a public hearing, the Board denied 
the rezoning by a 6-1 vote. 
The following June MHDC and three Negro individuals 
filed this lawsuit against the Village, seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relie£.3 A second nonprofit corporation and an 
individual of Mexican-American descent intervened as plain-
3 The individual plaintiffs sought certification of the action as a class 
action pur uant to Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23 but the District Court declined 
to certify. 373 F. Supp., at 209. 
.. 
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tiffs. The trial resulted in a judgment for petitioners. As-
suming the MHDC had standing to bring the suit, 1 the 
District Court held that the petitioners were not motivated 
by racial discrimination of intent to discriminate against low-
income groups when they denied rezoning, but rather by a 
desire "to protect property values and the integrity of the 
Village's zoning plan." 373 F. Supp., at 211. The District 
Court concluded also that the denial would not have a racially 
aiscriminatory effect. 
A divided Court of Appeals reversed. It first approved 
the District Court's finding that the defendants were moti-
vated by a concern for the integrity of the zoning plan, 
rather than by racial discrimination. Deciding whether the 
refusal would have discriminatory effects was come complex. 
-The court observed that the denial would have a dispropor-
tionate impacts on blacks. Based upon family income, blacks 
made up 40% of Lincoln Green's eligible prospective tenants 
·in the Chicago area, although they comprised a far lower per-
centage of total population. The court reasoned, however, 
that under our decision in James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137 
( 1971) , such a disparity in racial impact alone does not call 
for strict scrutiny of a municipality's decision that prevents 
the construction of low-cost housing.5 
There was another level to the court's analysis of allegedly 
discriminatory results. Invoking language from Kennedy 
Park Hames Association v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 
4 For reasons that are not clear from the record, a different district 
judge had heard early motions in the case. He had sustained i he com-
plaint against a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, and the judge 
who finally decided the caRe said he found "no need io re-examine [the 
predecessor judge's] conclusions" concerning justiciability. 373 F. Supp., 
at 209. 
5 Nor is there reason to subject the Village's action to more stringent 
review simply because it involves respondents' interest in securing housing. 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,73-74 (1972). Sre generally San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-39 (1973) . 
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108, 112 (CA2 1970), cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1970), 
the court ruled that the denial of rezoning must be examined 
in light of its "historical context and ultimate effect." 6 North-
west Cook County was enjoying rapid growth in employment 
opportunities and population, but it continued to exhibit a 
high degree of residential segregation. The court held that 
Arlington Heights could not simply ignore this problem. In-
deed, it found that the Village had been "exploiting" the situ-
ation by allowing itself to become a nearly all-white commu-
nity. 517 F. 2d, at 414. The Village had no other current 
plans for building low and moderate income housing, and 
no other R-5 parcels in the Village were available to MHDC 
at an economically feasible price. 
Against this background, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
the denial of the Lincoln Green proposal had racially dis-
criminatory effects and could be tolerated only if it served 
compelling interests. Neither the buffer policy nor the desire 
to protect property values met this exacting standard. The 
court therefore concluded that the denial violated the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
II 
At the outset, petitioners challenge the respondents' stand-
ing to bring th<' suit. It is not clear that this challenge was 
pressed in the Court of Appeals, but, since our jurisdiction 
to decide the case is implicated, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 
U.S. 411, 421 (1969) (plurality opinion), we shall consider it. 
In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 ( 1975) , a case similar in 
some respects to this one, we reviewed the constitutional 
limitations and prudential considerations that guide a court 
in determining a party's standing, and we need not repeat 
that discussion here. The essence of the standing question, 
6 This language apparently derived from our decision in Reitman v. 
Mulkey, 387 U. S. 369, 373 (1967) (quoting from the opinion of the 
California Supreme Court in the case then under review). 
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in its constitutional dimension, "is whether the plaintiff has 
'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy' as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdic-
tion and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers 
on his behalf." !d., at 498- 499, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 
U. S. 186, 204 (1962). The plaintiff must show that he him-
self is injured by the challenged action of the defendant. 
The injury may be indirect, see United States v. SCRAP, 
4:12 U.S. 669, 688 (1973), but the complaint -must indicate 
that the injury is indeed fairly traceable to the defendant's 
acts or omissions. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky WelfaT'e 
Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 41- 4'2 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 
414 U. S. 488, 498 (1974); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 
u.s. 614, 617 (1973). 
A 
Here there can be little doubt that MHDC meets the 
constitutional standiiig requirements. The challenged action 
of the petitioners stands as an absolute barrier to constructing 
the housing MHDC had contracted to place on the Viatorian 
site. If MHDC secures the injunctive relief it seeks, that 
barrier will be removed. An injunction would not, of course, 
guarantee that Lincoln Green will be built. MHDC would 
still have to secure financing, qualify for federal subsidies,7 
and have the construction work completed. But all housing 
developments are subJect to some extent to these uncertain-
ties. When a project is as detailed and specific as Lincoln 
Green, a court. is not l:'equired to engage in undue speculation 
7 Petitioners suggest that the suspension of the § 236 housing assistance 
program makes it impossible for MHDC to carry out its proposed project 
' and therefore deprives MHDC of standing. The District Court also ex-
'pressed doubts about MI-IDC's position in t he case in light of the sus-
pension. 373 F. Supp ., at 211. Whether termination of all available 
assistance programs would preclude standing is not a matter we need 
to decide, in view of the current likelihood that subsidies mLty be oecurcd 
under § 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. 
Seen. 2, supra. 
;,.• 
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as a predicate for finding that the plantiff has the requisite 
personal stake in the controversy. MHDC has shown an 
injury to itself that is "likely to be redressed by a favorable 
decision." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U. S., at 38. 
Petitioners nonethlcss appear to argue that MHDC lacks 
sta.nding because it has suffered no economic injury. MHDC, 
they point out, is not the owner of the property in question. 
Its contract of purchase is contingent upon securing rezoning.8 
MHDC owes the owners nothing if rezoning is denied. 
We cannot accept petitioners' argument. In the first place, 
it is inaccurate to say that MHDC suffers no economic injury 
from a refusal to rezone, despite the contingency provisions 
in its contract. MHDC has expended thousands of dollars 
on the plans for Lincoln Green and on the studies submitted 
to the Village in support of the petition for rezoning. Un-
less rezoning is granted, most of these plans and studies will 
be worthless even if MHDC finds another site at so attract-
tive a price. 
More importantly, petitioners' argument misconceives our 
standing requirements It has long been clear that economic 
injury is not the only kind of injury which can support a 
8 PetitiOiwrs contend that MHDC lacks standing to pursue its claim 
here because a contract purchaser whose contract is contingent upon 
rezoning cannot contest a zoning decision in the Illinois courts. Under 
the law of Illinois, only the owner of the property has standing to 
pursue such an action. Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. City of Evanston, 
23 Ill. 2d 48, 177 N. E. 2d 191 (1961); but see Solomon v. City of 
Evanston, 29 Ill. App. 3d 782, 331 N. E. 2d 380 (1975). 
State law, however, doPS not govern the standing detrrmination in 
the federal courts. The constitutional and prudential considerations 
canvassed at length in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 ( 1975), rr,.;pond 
to concerns that arc peculiarly federal in nature. Illinois may choose to 
close its courts to applicants for rezoning unless they have an interest 
more direct that MHDC's, but this choice does not necPssarily disqualify 
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plaintiff's standing. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. , at 
686- 687; Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S. 727, 734 (1972); 
Data Procesing Service v. Camp, 397 U. S. 150, 154 (1970) . . 
MHDC is a nonprofit corporation. Its interest in building 
Lincoln Green stems not from a desire for economic gain , 
but rather from an interest in making suitable low-cost hous-
ing available in areas where such housing is scarce. This in-
terest is not mere abstract concern about a problem. See 
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U. S., at 739. The specific project 
MHDC intends to build, whether or not it will generate 
profits, provides that "essential dimension of specificity" that 
informs judicial decisionmaking. Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, 418 U. S. 208, 221 (1974). 
B 
Clearly MHDC has met the constitutional requirements 
and it therefore does have standing to assert its own rights. 
Foremost among them is MHDC's right to be free of arbitrary 
or irrational zoning actions. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U. S. 
183 (1928); Village of Eelle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 
( 1974). But the heart of this litigation has never been the 
claim that the Village's decision fails the generous Euclid 
test, recently reaffirmed in Belle Terre. Instead it has been 
the claim that the Village's refusal to rezone discriminates 
against racial minorities in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity 
and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners' alleged 
discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied stand-
ing to assert the rights of third persons. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 499. But we need not decide whether to depart 
from that prudential limita.tion here and permit MHDC to 
assert the constitutional rights of its prospective minority 
tenants. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953); cf. 
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 220, 237 
(1969); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 72-73 (1917) . 
75-616-0PINION 
ARLINGTON HEIGHTS v. METROPOLITAN HOUSING CORP. 11 
For we have in this case at least one individual plaintiff 
who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his 
own.9 
Respondent Ransom, a Negro, works at the Honeywell 
factory in Arlington Heights and lives approximately 20 
miles away in Evanston in a 5-room house with his mother 
and his son. The complaint alleged that he seeks and would 
qualify for the housing MHDC wants to build in Arlington 
Heights. Ransom testified at trial that if Lincoln Green 
were built he would probably move there, since it is closer 
to his job. 
The injury Ransom asserts is that his quest for housing 
nearer his employment has been thwarted by official action 
that is racially discriminatory. If the court grants the relief 
he seeks, there is at least a "substantial probability," Warth 
v. Seldin, 422 U. S., at 504, that the Lincoln Green project 
will materialize, affording · Ransom the housing opportunity 
he desires in Arlington Heights. His is not a generalized griev-
ance. Instead, as we suggested in Warth, id., at 507, 508 
n. 18, it focuses on a particular project and is not dependent 
on speculation about the possible actions of third parties not 
before the court. See id., at 505; Simon v. Eastern Kentucky 
W elfw·e Rights Org., 426 U. S., at 41-42. Unlike the individ-
ual plaintiffs in Warth, Ransom has adequately averred an 
"actionable causal relationship" between Arlington Heights' 
zoning practices and his asserted injury. Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U. S., at 507. We therefore proceed to the merits. 
III 
Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 
229 ( 1976), made it clear that official action will not be held 
unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially dis-
9 Because of the presence of this plaintiff, we need not consider 
whether the other individual and corporate plaintiffs have standing to 
maintain the suit. 
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proportionate impact. "Disproportionate impact is not ir-
relevant, but it is not the sole touch stone of an invidious 
racial discrimination." I d., at 242. Proof of racia.lly discrilJl· 
inatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of 
the Equal Protection Clause. Although some contrary indi-
cations may be drawn from some of our cases,' 0 the holding 
in Davis reaffirmed a principle well established in a variety 
of contexts. E. g., Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U . . S. 
189, 208 (1973) (schools); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U. S. 
52, 56-57 (1964) (election districting); Akins v. Texas, 3~5 
U. S. 398, 403-404 (1945) (jury selection). 
Davis does not require a plaintiff to prove that the chal-
'lenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory pur-
poses. Rarely can it be said that a legislature or adminis-
trative body operating under a broad mandate made a 
decision motivated solely by a single concern, or even that 
a particular purposes was the "dominant" or "primary" one.11 
In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are prop-
erly concerned with balancing numerous competing considera-
tions that courts refrain from reviewing the merits of their 
decisions, absent a showing or arbitrariness or irrationality. 
But racial discrimination deserves no weight in the legislative 
scales. When there is proof that a discriminatory purpose 
has been a substantial factor in the decision, this judicial 
deference is no longer justified.12 
10 Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); Wright v. Council 
of the City of Emporia, 407 U. S. 451, 461-462 (1972); cf. United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 381-386 (1968). Sec discussion in 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 242-~44 (1976). 
11 In McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-277 (1973), in a some~ 
what different context, we observed: 
"The search for legislative purpose is often elusive enough, Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), without a requirement that primacy be 
~certained. Legislation is frequently multi purposed: the removal of 
even a 'subordinate' purpose may shift altogether the consensus of legis-
lative jtldgment supporting the statute." 
12 For a scholarly discussion of legislative motivation, see Bre;,'""t, Palmer 
•. 
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Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was 
a substantial factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be avail-
able. The impact of the official action-whether it "bears 
more heavily on one race than another," Washington v. Davis, 
426 U. S., at 242-may provide an important starting point. 
Sometimes a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds other 
than race, emerges from the effect of the state action even 
when the governing legislation appears neutral on its face. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Guinn v. United 
States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268 
(1939); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 ·u. S. 339 (1960). The 
evidentiary inquiry is then relatively easy?3 But such cases 
are rare. Absent a pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or 
Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative/1 and the Court 
must look to other evidence.15 
The historical background of the decision is one evidentiary 
source, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions 
taken for invidious purposes. See Lane v. Wilson, supra; 
Griffin v. County School Board, 377 U. S. 218 (1964); Davis 
v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legisla.-
tive Motive, 1971 Sup. Ct. Rev. 95, 116-118. 
13 Several of our jury selection cases fall into this category. Because 
of the nature of the jury selection task, however, we have permitted a 
finding of constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern docs 
not approach the cxtrrmcs of Yiclc Wo or Gomillion. See, e. g., Tu1'ner 
v. Fouche, 396 U. S. 346, 359 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 U. S. 404, 
407 (1967). 
14 This is not to say that a consistent pattern of official discrimination 
is a neccssnry predicate to a violation of the equal protection clause. A 
single invidiously discriminatory governmental act-in the exercise of the 
zoning power as elsewhere-would not be immunized by the absence of 
such discrimination in the making of other comparable decisions. See 
' City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U. S. 358, 378 (1975). 
15 In many instances, to recognize the limited probative value of dis-
proportionate impact is merely to acknowledge the "heterogeneity" of the 
nation's population. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U. S. 535, 548 (1972); 
see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S., at 248. 
.. . 
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v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (SD Ala.), aff'd per curiam, 
336 U. S. 933 (1949); cf. Keyes v. School District No. 1, 
413 U. S., at 207. The specific sequence of events leading 
up to the challenged decision also may shed some light on 
the decisionmaker's purposes. Reitrrw,n v. Mulkey, 387 U. S. 
369, 373-376 (1967); Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U. S. 
233, 250 (1936). For example, if the property involved here 
always had been zoned R-5 but suddenly was changed to 
R-3 when the town learned of MHDC's plans to erect in-
tegrated housing/6 we would have a far different case. De-
partures from the normal procedural sequence also might 
afford evidence that improper purposes are playing a role. 
Substantive departures too may be relevant, particularly if 
the factors usually considered· important by the decision-
maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached.17 
The legislative or administrative history may be highly rele-
vant, especially where there are contemporary statements by 
16 See, e. g., Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 286 F. 2d 222 
· (CA7 1961) (park board allegedly condemned plaintiffs' land for ~~ park 
· upon learning that the homes plaintiffs were erecting there would be sold 
·under a marketing plan designed to assure integration); Kennedy Park 
Homes Association, Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F. 2d 108 (CA2 
1970) , cert. denied, 401 U. S. 1010 (1971) (town declared moratorium 
on new subdivisions and rezoned area for park land shortly after learning 
, of plaintiffs' plans to build low income houHing). To the extent that 
the decision in Kennedy Park Homes rested solely on a finding of dis-
criminatory impact, wf' h:we indicated our disagreement. Washington v. 
Davis, 426 U. S., at 244-245. 
17 See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F. 2d 1037 (CA10 1970). The 
plaintiffs in Dailey planned to build low income housing on the site of 
a former school that they had purchased. The city refused to rezone 
the land from PF, its · public facilities classification, to R-4, high-density 
residential. All the surrounding area was zoned R-4, and both the 
present and' the former planning director for the city testified that there 
was no rca on "from a zoning standpoint" why the land should not be 
classified R-4. Based on this and other evidencf', the Comi of Appeals 
ruled that "the record sustains the [District Court's] holding of racial 
motivation and· of arbitrary and unreasonable action." /d., at 1040 . 
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members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, 
or reports. In some instances the members might be called 
to the stand at trial to testify concerning the purpose of the 
official action, although such testimony frequently will be 
barred by privilege. See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367 
(1951); United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 (1974); 
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2371 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).18 
The ~oregoing summary identifie·s, without purporting to 
be exhaustive, ~ubjects of proper inquiry in determining 
w~ether racially. discriminatory int~nt existed, With these 
in mind, we now address the case before us. 
IV 
This case was tried 'in the District Court and reviewed in 
the Court of App~als before our decision in Washington v. 
Davis, supra. The respondents proceeded on the erroneous 
theory that the Village's refusal to rezone carried a racially 
discriminatory effect and was, without more, unconstitutional. 
But both courts below understood that at least part of their 
function was to examine the purpose underlying the decision. 
In making its findings on this issue, the District Court noted 
that some of the opponents of Lincoln Green who spoke at 
the various hearings might have been motivated by opposi-
tion to minority groups. The court held, however, that the 
evidence "does not warrant the conclusion that this motivated 
the defendants." 373 F. Su.pp., at 211. 
On appeal the Court of Appeals focused primarily on re-
18 Tllis Court has recognized, ever since Fletcher v. Peele, 6 Cranch 87, 
130-131 (1810), that judicial inquiries into legislative or executive mo-
tivation represent a substantial intrusion into the workings of other 
branches of government. The problems involved have prompted a good 
deal of scholarly commentary. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal 
Protection of tlw Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 , 356--361 (1949); A. Bickel, 
The Least Dangerous Branch, 208-221 (1962); Ely, Legislative and 
Aqministrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205 
(1970); Brest, supra, n. 8. 
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spondents' claim that the Village's buffer policy had not 
been consistently applied and was being invoked with a 
strictness here that could only demonstrate some other under-
lying motive. The court concluded that the buffer policy, 
though not always applied with perfect consistency, had on 
several occasions formed the basis for the Board's decision 
to deny other rezoning proposals. "The evidence does not 
necessitate a finding that Arlington Heights administered this 
policy in a discriminatory manner." 517 F. 2d, at 412. The 
Court of Appeals therefore approved the District Court's 
findings concerning the Village's purposes in denying rezoning 
to MHDC. 
We also have reviewed the evidence. The impact of the 
Village's decision does arguably bear more heavily on racial 
minorities. Minorities comprise 181o of the Chl.cago area 
population, and 40% of the income groups said to be eligible 
for Lincoln Green. Although this disparity is not excessive, 
when viewed agains~ the background of substantial de facto 
housing segregation in Arlington Heights, it docs support fur-
ther inquiry. But the evidence tending to negate the presence 
of discriminatory purpose substantially outweights the am-
biguous force of the disparity. There is little about the 
sequence of events leading up to the decision that would 
spark suspicion. The area around the Viatorian property 
has been zoned R-3 since 1959, the year when Arlington 
Heights first adopted a zoning map. Single-family homes 
surround the 80-acre site, and the Village is undeniably com-
mitted to single-family homes as its dominant residential land 
use. The rezoning request progressed according to the usual 
procedures.10 The Plan Commission even scheduled two ad-
10 Respondents have made much of one apparent proredural departure. 
The parties stipulated that the Village Planner, the staff member whose 
primary responsibility covered zoning and planning matters, was never 
asked for his written or oral opinion of the rezoning request. The 
omission does seem curious, but respondents failed to prove at trial what 
role the Planner customarily played in rezoning decisions. The record 
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ditional hearings, at least in part to accommodate MHDC 
and permit it to supplement its presentation with answers 
to questions generated at the first hearing. 
The statements by the Plan Commission and Village Board 
members, as reflected in the official minutes, focused almost 
exclusively on the zoning aspects of the MHDC petition, 
and the zoning factors on which they relied are not novel 
criteria in the Village's rezoning decisions. There is no rea-
son to doubt that there has been reliance by some neighbor-
ing property owners on the maintenance of single-family 
zoning in the vicinity. The Village originally adopted its 
buffer policy long before MHDC entered the picture and has 
applied the policy too consistently for us to infer discrimina-
tory purpose from its application in this case. Finally, 
MHDC called one member of the Village Board to the stand 
at trial. Nothing in her testimony supports an inference of 
invidious purpose.20 
In sum, the evidence does not warrant overturning the 
concurrent findings of both courts below. Respondents sim-
ply failed to prove that discriminatory purpose was a substan-
tial factor in the Village's decision. This conclusion ends the 
constitutional inquiry. The Court of Appeals' further find-
ing that the Village's decision carried a discriminatory "ulti-
does not indicate whether this omission represents a substantial departure 
from the usual procedures. 
20 Respondents complain that the District Court unduly limited their 
efforts to prove that the Village Board acted for discriminrrtory purposes, 
since it forbade questioning Board members about their motivation at 
the time they cast their votes. We perceive no abuse of discretion in 
the circumstances of this case, even if such an inquiry into motivrrtion 
would otherwise have been proper. Seen. 18, supra. RespondPnts were 
allowed, both during the di::;covery phase and at trial, to quesiion Board 
members fully about materials and information available to them at the 
time of decision. In light of respondents' repeated insistence that it 
was effect and not motivation which would make out a constitutional 
violation, the District Court's action was not improper. 
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mate effect" is without independent legal significance. The 
judgment is reversed. 
v 
Respondents' complaint also alleged that the refusal to 
rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U. S. C. § 3601 et 
seq. They have urged that claim here. The Court of Ap-
peals, however, proceeding in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, 
did not decide the statutory question. We remand the case 
for further consideration limited to that issue. 
Reversed and remanded .. 
